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" No taxation without representation"' was the battle cry of the American people 
against the power of England to tax the American colonies in 1765. 
(Interestingly, Zaidi (2002) mentions that in recent tax culture debate in Pakistan 
this battle cry has been reversed to " No representation without taxation"). 
This battle cry stood for democracy and freedom and may therefore hint at the 
key features of the tax culture in the New World. 
In view of today's progressive globalization, international coordination and the 
clash of different cultures and divergent tax systems caused thereby, one would 
think national "tax culture" to be a fashionable topic of economics and public 
finance (particularly of taxation). The topic, a discussion of a tax culture from a 
South African perspective is broached in this dissertation, precisely at the 
intersection of the disciplines economics, sociology and history. 
Recently, the importance of tax cultural consideration has become more obvious, 
since the necessary reform measures to the tax systems of transformation 
economies, partly have failed due to their tax cultural incompatibility. 
South Africa comes from a past where several factors came together to create a 
compliance culture that is less than it should be. These factors include: 
• The economic marginalisation and consequent lack of knowledge about 
tax of a large segment of the population. 
• The mindset and practices that took hold when circumventing the 
imposition of international sanctions. 
• The historically limited capacity of the tax and customs administrations to 
challenge tax evasion and highly arguable, or even fanciful, tax planning 
structures and techniques. 
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The objective of this dissertation is first to give a brief account on how we define 
tax culture, using the an embeddedness approach (Compare Granovetter (1985) 
and Nerre (2001a: 107ff.) considering the history of taxation and by that means 
explicating national tax cultural diversity. 
In the course of continuing globalization two different kinds of disturbances to tax 
culture may be identified: tax culture shocks and tax culture lags. Both are due to 
ignorant and/or ethnocentric policy measures. While lags are caused almost 
inevitably during any transformation or reform process, shocks should be 
prevented by implementing tax political measures on an international (and 
national) level in a tax cultural conform way. 
A brief overview of a case study of a tax cultural shock- Japan, tax cultural lag -
Russia, and a brief characterization of the Austrian political setting and tax 
system will be reviewed. Thereafter we will look at the tax culture, tax collection 
and governance in South Africa, tax reform and democratic accountability in Sub-
Saharan Africa and the regulating of tax practitioners in South Africa. 
We have made progress together, over the first ten years of democracy, in South 
Africa. Reflecting on Amarty Sen's brave formulation of the central intent of 
economic progress: freedom is the primary aim of development, and also the 
principal means of achieving it. 
The formulation of that intent that goes back 49 years, to the 26th of June 1955: 
the freedom charter reflects our aspiration for political freedom, freedom from 
poverty, freedom to transform our society, its culture and values, freedom to 
explore our capabilities, the freedom that will grant our children choices that our 
parents did not enjoy. 
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This is a freedom that opens up opportunities but also imposes disciplines; it is a 
freedom that creates capabilities, but expects stewardship; it is a freedom that 
rewards enterprise, but calls for accountability. It is a freedom we have used to 
build a new society, mould a new culture and create hope and opportunity for 
future generations. 
In South Africa the tax policy over the past decade has been completely 
reshaped. We have changed from a source based tax system to taxing the 
global earnings of South African residents. We have begun taxing capital gains, 
reduced corporate tax rates and made substantial reductions in personal income 
tax rates, especially for low and middle-income workers. 
We have zero rated paraffin, reduced ad valorem excise taxes and introduced a 
lower tax rate for small businesses. Equally impressive is the change in tax 
administration. In a short period of time, the South African Revenue Service has 
overhauled many of its procedures and systems. 
We have created an environment that promotes tax compliance. This is almost 
unique in developing countries. The outcome of these policy changes and 
administrative reforms is that we have been able to reduce the deficit, increase 
resources available for spending and give considerable relief to individuals. 
These factors, including improved tax morality, have had an immeasurably 
positive impact on the economy. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. TAX CULTURE 
The term "tax culture" can rarely be found throughout economic literature 
and appears to be an emotive word (Pausch (1992:8). This character is 
based mainly on the fact that the average taxpayer would have difficulty 
in thinking of the exploitation instrument "taxation" as an artistic creation 
of the human mind). 
Accordingly, a brief overview of selected nuances occurring is given in section 
(2.1.). A synthesis of its different interpretation then leads to our working 
definition of "tax culture"(2.2.). Subsequently, (2.3.) deals with possible 
disturbances of tax culture. 
2.1. TAX CULTURE IN ECONOMIC LITERATURE 
Several groups of economist writing about tax culture can be distinguished. 
Section (2.1.1.) is a small group of economists which I have classified "classics". 
On the other hand the transformation economists in (2.1.2). 
2.1.1 THE "CLASSICS" 
It was more than 70 years ago that Sch urn peter used the term "tax culture" in his 
celebrated article "Economics and Sociology of the Income Tax"( Schumpeter 
(1929, translation BN): "Okonomie and Sociology der Einkommensteuer), 
where already its evolutionary character was emphasized:" Like any social 
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institution every tax outlives the era of its economic and psychological 
appropriateness. 
But as with all other social institutions anything nonconformist in the tax system 
does not live eternally. Slowly the tide of evolution wears it away" (Schumpeter 
(1929:385, translation BN): 
Schumpeter assigns the term" tax culture" only to the degree of progressiveness 
or modernity and to the smartness tax design. 
He regards taxation as an "art" (Already in 1868, the German Hugo Eisenhart 
titled one of his books "The Art of Taxation" (Eisenhart 1868:"Die Kunst der 
Besteuerung", translationBN), which suggests an understanding of "tax culture" 
by means of the definition "art creation of cultural goods" (such as sculpture, 
painting, theatre etc) and distinguishes it from taxation as a mere "craft"(The 
distinction between "economics as an art" and "economics as a science" can 
already be attributed to John Stuart Mill)1848). 
Consequently, the Schumpeterian understanding of "tax culture" focuses on its 
creators, the tax economists and tax politicians, who create an artificial thing, a 
national system of taxation? This meaning seems a little too narrow for the 
purposes of this work; however, the emphasis of the evolutionary character 
should enter into the working definition in section 2.2. 
A similar position concerning "tax culture" can be found with Armin Spitaler 
(1954), about whom Alfons Pausch notes that "Spitaler knew that the 
combination of taxes and culture would seem fairly ambitious and highly 
Page 5 
pathetical"( Pausch (1992; 145, translation BN): "Spitaler wubte, dab die 
Verbindung von Steuer und Kultur Manchen »reichlich hochgegriffen« und 
von»holem Pathos«ersheinen mochte".), and to whom Pausch attributes the 
invention of the term "tax culture"( Pausch (1992:9) As mentioned above, the 
term "tax culture" can be found already in Schumpeter (1929). Even four years 
earlier, in 1925, Franz Merisel used the term of "tax culture", however, without 
explaining it, compare Merisel) 1925,1926). 
Furthermore, Spitaler postulated the convergence of the tax system of the 
"civilized nations" (rationalized by Wagner's Law) and thus followed the 
Schumpeterian line of thought, however, modified by the above-mentioned 
postulate. 
On account of the contrary empirical experiences this postulate is not included in 
our subsequent working definition Spitaler distinguishes between "cultivated" and 
"non-cultivated" tax systems, roughly assigning those attributes to creditor and 
debtor countries of the fifties, respectively. 
Important for a comprehensive definition of tax culture, though, appears Spitaler's 
on sight that taxation is influenced by economics, social, cultural, historical, 
geographical, psychological and further differences prevailing in the individual 
countries and their societies (Pusch (1992: 9, translation BN): 
Alfons Pausch (1992) understands the 'tax culture" of a country as being closely 
connected with the personalities determining the evolution of the tax system. 
His understanding also resembles the Schumpeterian viewpoint: "Tax culture is 
an expression of human spirituality and creativity"(Sometimes the individual 
allocation to one of the above-mentioned groups was rather complicated, 
especially in cases where economist holds a political position). 
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Thus the evolution is being emphasized against its historical background, 
however, limited to the side of the tax legislation and the tax system design. 
2.1.2 TAX CULTURE IN THE TRANSFORMATION CONTEXT 
For the better evaluation of the comments of the economists on tax culture in the 
transformation context, different "origins" of those dealing with tax culture can be 
identified. First, there is some work coming from the sphere of economics. 
Then, there are some aspects coming from politicians and state officials (In any 
case, it should be emphasized that in Latin America the "cultural tributary", i.e. 
"tax culture", is part of academic discussion. The understanding focuses on 
voluntary compliance). 
This dissertation focuses on the transformation process in Eastern Europe, 
especially in Russia. Thus, e.g. the Latin American context is not taken into 
account (In any case, it should be emphasized that in Latin America the "cultural 
tributary", i.e. "tax culture", is part of academic discussion. Its understanding 
focuses on voluntary compliance and on public methods to increase the 
propensity to be honest in the taxation process; compare e.g. Cortazar Velarde 
(2000). 
2.1.2.1 THE "ECONOMISTS" 
Already in 1997 Michael Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, proclaimed 
in a speech at the Moscow Institute of International Affairs the formation 
"Taxpaying culture" (Candessus (1997) His interpretation, as well as 
that of most economists seems to aim at Schmolers Tax mentality ( 
e.g. Beichelt et al.1969, Strumpel 1969 or Schmolders 1970) to be the 
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medium-term goal for transformation politics in Russia (The possibility to 
develop a tax mentality by intention is expressed already with Strumpel 
(1968:28) who expected, substantial discretion for shaping tax mentality in 
the long runs). 
It should be based on voluntary compliance with transparent tax laws, which 
should be applied consistently. Thus, Camdessus expresses the current opinion 
among transformation economist, which limits the understanding of tax culture 
exclusively to the taxpayers' side (Nevertheless, the formation of the tax paying 
culture should be accompanied by substantial improvements on behalf of the tax 
authorities, even though their part is not seen in connection with the prevailing 
tax culture). 
IMF economist led by the recently retired Vito Tanzi (Comp. Tanzi (1999), Tanzi 
& Tsibouris (2000), and IMF Survey (2000) understand a country's "tax culture" 
as a certain "tax consciousness' on the part of the taxpayers. In most 
transformation economies, taxpayer lacks this specific consciousness because of 
the long-time prevailing planned economy. 
Central planners tried to avoid any contact of taxpayers with direct taxes and 
relied on indirect means of (hidden) taxation, which were not made noticeable to 
the taxpayers, but rather disguised by the authorities in charge (This behavior 
contradicts the postulate of transparency of taxation). 
The introduction of explicit tax systems was met by "hostility" (Tanzi (1999). of 
the tax subject. Further, the understanding why one has to pay taxes constitutes 
a facet of tax culture. (Comp. IMF Survey (2000) 
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2.2. WORKING DEFINITION OF TAX CULTURE 
The concept of tax culture presented here can be explained from its conceptual 
dismantling in the individual term's "tax" and "culture". From the viewpoint of the 
"taxes" not only the tax system and the actual tax practice from part of a country's 
" tax culture", but also the relationship between the authorities and taxpayers 
accounts for the unique "tax culture" of a country. Moreover, the relations 
between taxpayers must be considered a very important part of "tax culture", as 
can be seen from the Swiss case made for transparency. 
This behavior contradicts the postulate of transparency of taxation. As regards 
the tax authorities, the structure of the individual levels' competencies must be 
taken into account, how are tax revenues to be distributed between local and 
central bodies? How explicit and precise is the tax law on that account and how 
consequently are violations sanctioned? Which (rival) interest groups do exist? 
This incomplete list of questions is a particular important part of national tax 
culture, especially in transformation economies ( Bell (1998), Berkowitz & Li 
(1999), Blanchand & Shleifer (2000), Shleifer & Treisman (2000). 
However, the component of "culture" is far more important: Although there is, 
according to Geert Hofstede (Compare Hofstede (1983:77), no scientific 
language to define "culture" (Hermann Pilath (1999a) wrote a critical essay in 
question), in the course of the work reference is made exclusively to the national 
culture as such. 
In style of the "Shared Mental Models" a la Denzau & North (1994)("Mental 
models are the internal presentations that individual cognitive system create to 
interpret the environment"[Denzau & North(1994)] "culture" should be understood 
as "the collective programming of the mind"(Hofstede 1983, 1991). 
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Panter calls culture: a learned system of meaning/interpretations (including 
values) shared by group of actors"(Panther (1999a: 24; 1999b: 165; 2000: 1; 
translation BN): 
It becomes clear that the understanding of "culture" aims at its evolutionary 
character; the cultural factors are continuously in an ongoing modification 
process stimulated by external and internal inputs (At this point reference should 
be made to evolutionary game theory. For an introductory overview see 
e.g.Holler & Ming (2000, chapter 8). Jones (1995: 274 - 275) points out that 
"cultures [...] may persist in their current form only while there is no challenge. [...] 
Gradual modifications take place even in Western societies"). Consequently, 
culture itself is "a dynamic phenomenon of interaction, not a fixed equipment of 
the factors (Herrmann-Pillath (1999b: 90; translation BN): Similarly Granovetter 
(1985: 486) notes that "culture is not a once-for-all influence but an ongoing 
process"). 
The synthesis of the two terms "tax" and "culture" succeeds via the just 
mentioned evolutionary process: history is the linking or embedding variable. 
Namely, both subject areas are embedded in the national historical events (in the 
sense of Granovetter's "historical embeddeness" ( e.g. Granovetter (1985: 486). 
The general idea of embeddedness can already be found with Schumpeter 
(1950). Other forms of embeddedness are e.g. structural, cognitive, cultural, 
political ( Zukin & DiMaggio 1990: 14 ff. and Smelser & Swedberg 1994), and 
regional embeddedness (cf. Nerre 2001a: 107 ff.). 
In this regard, already Schumpter found that "every tax ideal has got its historical, 
economics and sociological boundaries (Schumpeter (1929: 383, translation BN): 
In the context of taxation guidelines, Scheer (1996: 156, translation BN) points 
out unmistakably: "One surely cannot expect that the guidelines for a 'right' 
taxation are independent of time and location. 
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In this way, the existence or creation of a universal and "objectively good" system 
of taxation becomes implicitly impossible (An opposing position is taken by e.g. 
Manfred Rose, who scientifically supervised the introduction of a consumption-
oriented income tax in Croatia and holds the opinion that solely economic factors 
are to be considered for the design of any tax system; cf. e.g. Rose (1998a,b). 
This is a contradiction to the proclamation of the existence of a gap within 
economics "between pure fiction and cultural reality" (GroG. 1999, translation BN), 
and as well as to the above mentioned "embeddedness" argument. 
Thus, a "tax culture" specific to a particular country emerges coined by tradition 
of taxation (e.g. an accentuation of [in-] direct taxes) on the one hand, and by the 
interaction of the actors and the cultural values (Buchanan (1995: 195) states 
appropriately: "Differences in cultural history must exert behavioral 
consequences) like "honesty", "justice" or also "sense of duty" on the other hand. 
The latter resembles the by definition taken more narrowly tax mentality that 
consists of the two components of tax moral and tax discipline and solely aims at 
the relationship of the taxpayer to the tax state. 
Above all, the German Cologne school around Guenter Schmolders and his 
students treated this subject during the fifties and the sixties comprehensively. 
Tretter (1974), who gives the following definition, in this regard gives a pass-able 
overview: 
"Tax mentality includes all attitudes and also all patterns of behavior which 
the tax-paying citizens hold against (or with?) the tax and the state" (Trett 
(1974:39, translation BN): 
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In general tax moral is used as a term connected with a certain "willingness-to-
pay taxes", a feeling of obligation to the state (according to the benefit principle) 
or the obligation to the general public or community (with tax moral according to 
the ability-to-pay principle), respectively. Tax discipline then reflects the attitudes 
of the taxpayer in his or her actions. 
DEFINITION: TAX CULTURE 
A country-specific tax culture is the entirety of all relevant formal and informal 
institutions connected with the national tax system and its practical execution, 
which are historically embedded within the country's culture, including the 
dependencies and ties caused by their ongoing interaction. 
Accordingly, tax culture contains even more than "culture of taxation" and 
"taxpaying culture". 
A simplified overview which could easily be enhanced by more details is 
presented in figure one. It shows the embeddedness of the actors into the 
national culture with its subset of tax culture. Cultural norms and historically 
developed institutions both determine the tax code. 
The latter sets the environment and the constraints, i.e. the rules for the tax 
game. Players include (among others) taxpayers, politicians, tax officials, expert 
(e.g. tax advisors), and academics. The arrows indicate interaction between the 
different groups of players as well as between the members of one and the same 
group (e.g. academics meet at academic conferences). 
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By the ongoing interaction, social ties and dependencies are developed over 
time. I have left out an interaction arrow between academics and taxpayers, 
because I am not sure about the relationship between both groups (academics 
tend to model taxpayers far differently than they act in reality, taxpayers seem to 
know that and thus do not care about propositions academics makes). 
Figurel 
The Embeddedness of Tax culture 
2.3. DISTURBANCES OF TAX CULTURE 
From sections one and two one might hopefully be able to imagine what a 
nation's tax culture is about. The question remains, however, what is the use of 
this knowledge. From a tax-cultural perspective, the answer lies in occurring 
abnormalities or disturbances. What tax culture is about is often only realized 
when changes to the tax system cause more or less serious problems. During 
transformation processes, e.g., any country's political culture is subject more or 
less dramatic changes. Being a part of political Culture ( Strumpel (1969: 28), the 
tax culture suffers from certain problems, as well. Foreign advisers who might not 
be tax-culturally conditioned in the same way as the advised country's society 
often plays the most crucial part. Therefore, institutional conflicts are inevitable 
during the attempted transfer of a particular tax system into a different "tax 
culture" following a "big-bang" approach. 
In such cases so-called "tax culture shocks" (Compare Nerre (2000, 2001b). 
are unavoidably caused (section 2.3.1 with smoother "gradualist approaches" or 
with any attempt of gradual tax reform in general, serious shocks might be 
avoided. Nevertheless, phenomena might be observed due to adaptation 
processes which have named "tax culture lags"(section 2.3.2). 
2.3.1 TAX CULTURE SHOCKS 
The term "culture shock" was coined about 40 years ago by the anthropologist 
Kalervo Oberg, who published the results of his personal observations of 
American expatriates in 1960 (Oberg 1960). Following Oberg, other authors 
placed their emphasis on "language shock" (Smalley 1963) or "role shock" 
(Byrnes 1966), but in principle described only facets of the same phenomenon. In 
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contemporary literature on international management, cross-cultural 
management or human resource management there can be found a chapter on 
the theory of culture shocks in almost any textbook(Compare Chaney & Martin 
(1995), Harris & Moran (1996), Lewis (1996) and Deresky (2000). 
There, the negative reactions of individuals to (unexpected) patterns of behavior 
in a foreign culture are described, resulting in a feeling of insecurity, lack of 
understanding or uneasiness. 
Shocks in the field of tax culture can emerge during an encounter with an 
unknown or foreign tax culture. A distinction should be made, though: shocks 
may be observed on the individual or micro level, or on the collective or macro 
level. 
Above all, individual tax culture shocks have become more and more common in 
the course of today's globalization. They are part of the overall "culture shock" 
(which is well-known from management literature.) If taxes are to be paid in 
another country (host country). In the case of a certain "strangeness" of the 
prevailing local tax culture, where the values reflected possibly differ from those 
of one's own inherent tax culture, this may well lead to a feeling of unfair 
processing (One could theoretically think of a positive surprise as well if the 
individual got the feeling of paying less taxes), helplessness in view of the 
prevailing tax practice, insecurity etc. 
In the case of a shock on the micro level, there are two possibilities to solve it: 
The individual either returns to his home country (Hirschmann's "costs of exit" in 
that case must be lower than the costs of remaining in the foreign tax culture), or 
undergoes a process of adaptation (The duration and the inconveniences of this 
process depend on different factors, e.g. on the degree of difference between the 
tax culture of the host country and the individual's home country, on the 
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individual's cultural adaptability etc), which may lead to a better understanding of 
the host country's tax culture. 
« 
Collective tax culture shocks are to be observed by far more rarely. They are 
characterized by the fact that both the taxpayers (in their entirety) and the tax 
administration suffer considerably from them. While the first aspect might be 
quite obvious (in the sense of massively occurring individual shocks), the second 
aspect perhaps needs a further explanation. For this purpose, three possible 
scenarios will be presented: 
A certain tax system being forced onto a nation by an external power (One could 
think of a situation where internal powers enforce a new tax system on a country 
the course of a malevolent dictator's military putsch). 
(1) in the course of a state of emergency, 
(2) the introduction of a new tax system dictated by donor nations or donor 
organizations (e.g. the IMF or the World Bank) during transformation 
processes, and 
(3) the enforcement of a tax system by the central power of a federation. 
The effects caused by the situation described in the third case crucially depend 
on the approach chosen by the authorities. In the case of a so-called "big-leap 
approach", which consists of sudden and unexpected changes in the existing 
system of taxation, an event similar to a shock could possibly occur. 
In this case, tax administration would be confronted with a great number of new 
and unknown rules (i.e. tax laws), which can possibly lead to enforcement and 
implementation problems. With a "gradualist approach", though, all changes are 
implemented in small steps over a longer period of time. 
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Thus, it is to be expected that the tax administration and the taxpayers would get 
accustomed to the new rules little by little. 
Therefore, a shock on the macro level cannot occur with the latter approach. 
Such a situation would be conceivable for example on the EU level. The "central 
power" (e.g. the European Parliament) would also need a parliamentary and 
constitutional legitimization in order to be able to enact a "tax reform". 
If that were given, there would not be any argument against a reorganization of 
the national systems of taxation on the constitutional level. Nevertheless, it would 
seem to be a violation of the national objectives (Concerning constitutional 
economic issues compare e.g. Kirsch (1997: chapter 4) if no veto right had been 
provided in the constitution of the federation. Thus, even though there could not 
arise any conflict because of the democratic line of legitimization, indeed a 
collective tax culture shock in the broadest sense (so-called secondary tax 
culture shock) might be caused if an affected country could not influence the new 
tax design significantly (on the EU level, however, a veto right is provided Keen 
(1993:16). In that case, problems could for example arise due to log Rolling 
activities as well). 
In that case, taxpayers and national tax authorities see themselves confronted 
with unknown taxes and tax laws possibly contradicting there own 
national/cultural values. The second scenario mentioned above takes account of 
the fact that the most crucial part in transformation processes is often played by 
foreign advisers who are not tax-culturally conditioned in the same way as the 
advised country's society. 
Western industrialized countries often offer foreign aid to so-called developing 
countries only on the condition that the prevailing financial systems (including the 
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tax system) be reformed according to the aiding countries' ideals (Russia might 
serve as an example (for a so-called "tax developing country") in this case, 
compare Nerre (2001 d, e). E.g. in 1996, 1997, and 1998, the IMF was only willing 
to provide further funds if tax revenues would increase significantly in the nearest 
future (thus, in this example there is no direct patronage concerning the tax 
system); comp. Franklin (1997: 137) and Shleifer & Treisman (2000: 148, 176). 
The IMF demand led to very brutal methods of tax collection in Russia (by elite 
soldiers), which did not seem very stimulating for Russia's emerging tax culture, 
cf. Berger(1998). 
Therefore, institutional conflicts are inevitable during the attempted transfer of 
a particular tax system (or only of a particular tax!) into a different "tax culture", 
especially when following a "big-bang" approach. The results of such 
ethnocentric measures are even lower compliance rates and lower working moral 
of tax officials than before. 
A perfect example for a shock on the macro level is the first case described 
above: changes in the national tax system are made against the will of the voters 
and without democratic legitimization. The tax administration sees itself 
confronted with new, obscure and above all unwanted changes in the system of 
taxation and taxation practice. Moreover, the administration is possibly put under 
pressure by the controlling forces that would like to observe the intended 
"success" as soon as possible. 
In connection with this one scenario's might be imagined: the violent occupation 
of one country by another one in the course of belligerent activities (See Nerre 
(2000) for a case study of the events in Japan in the aftermaths of WW II). 
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A tax culture shock on the macro level as well as one on the micro level causes a 
feeling of insecurity concerning the new rules of taxation, of dissatisfaction, of 
being insulted and similar feelings, equally found with the mass of the taxpayers 
as well as the tax administration. 
Furthermore, the tax moral and the tax discipline in the country is to be expected 
to decline, the tax resistance on behalf of the taxpayers, on the contrary, to rise. 
Also, from the part of the tax administration a decline in working moral will occur 
because the tax officials see themselves confronted with new tax laws and an 
external pressures for success. 
The course of the shock and its long-term effects depend on the methods chosen 
(In the case of a hostile occupation a big-leap approach has to be expected) 
as well as on the duration and the degree of strictness of the enforced 
patronage. Should the latter be of continuous nature and of a high degree, a 
laborious and painful adaptation process will be triggered, which can probably 
lead to a slow modification of the prevailing tax culture of the patronized country. 
In the case of a short-termed patronage of relatively tax character, soon reforms 
and /or adaptations to the well known tax culture might be expected (This 
resembles the situation in evolutionary game theory, where a mutant (here: the 
occupier) enters a (foreign) population and plays a formerly unknown strategy. 
If the mutant leaves the population again after a certain time (either exit or 
death), the continued existence of his strategy (here: the "strange" tax system) 
depend on the question, whether its fitness outperforms that of the old-
established players' strategies or not), as could be observed e.g. in Japan after 
World War II. 
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2.3.2 TAX CULTURE LAGS 
Even if by using a gradualist approach to tax reform, tax culture shocks may !) 
be avoided. Troubles in the sphere of taxation are inevitable in the majority of tax 
reform projects. One has to keep in mind that a tax reform means to change one 
part of a nation's tax culture first: namely, the tax code, i.e. the formal institution 
of law. 
The remaining parts of the tax culture stay unchanged for the time being, they lag 
behind in the tax culture's evolution. Thus, a phenomenon might occur which I 
have named "tax culture lag" (Sociologist use the expressions "culture lag" and 
"cultural lag" synonymously. In earlier contributions they have used the term tax 
cultural lag, but to relate the lag phenomena more closely and more obviously to 
the concept of tax culture shocks I have decided to use the expression "tax 
culture lag" from now on). 
It has been borrowed from the concept of culture lag which was developed by the 
economist Thorstein Veblen (1899) and the American sociologist William F. 
Ogburn (1922) (While Veblen published his "Theory of the Leisure Class" already 
in 1899, Ogburn coined the expression of "cultural lag" only in 1914, when 
holding a chair in economics and sociology at Reed College. In 1915 the theory 
was improved until in 1922 his "Social Change" was published. The accusation of 
stealing the theory from Veblen is strictly rejected by Ogburn: "I have been 
accused of taking the theory from Thorstein Veblen [...but] I am quite sure [...] I 
had never read him on this point"; comp. Ogburn (1957: 168, 1964: 87). 
While Veblen analyzed the process of economic evolution in the framework of 
cultural evolution, Ogburn looked at social evolution in the context of cultural 
evolution. 
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Just like the concept of culture shock can be found in almost any textbook of 
international management, the phenomenon of "culture lag" is part of most 
contemporary textbooks of sociology ( Brinkman & Brinkman (1997: 609). 
"The cultural lag approach has been one of the master concepts of modern social 
analysis. [...] The concept of culture lag, which Veblen used to analyses social 
processes, has been widely used by American sociologists to account for both 
social change and social processes"(Davis (1968: 304 f.). 
Ogburn offers the following definition for culture lag phenomena: "A cultural lag 
occurs when one of two parts of culture which are correlated changes before or 
in greater degree than the other part does, thereby causing less adjustment 
between the two parts then existed previously" (Ogburn (1957: 167, 1964: 86). 
The 1922 definition in his "Social Change" is even more comprehensive 
especially for the transfer of the concept to the field of tax culture: "The various 
parts of modern culture are not changing at the same rate, some parts are 
changing much more rapidly than others; and that since there is a correlation and 
interdependence of parts, a rapid change in one part of our culture requires 
readjustments through other changes in the various correlated parts of culture 
Where one part of culture changes first, through some discovery or invention 
there frequently is a delay in the changes occasioned in the dependent part of 
culture. 
The extent of this lag will vary according to the nature of the cultural material, but 
may exist for a considerable number of years, during which time there may be 
said to be a maladjustment" (Ogburn (1922: 200). He explains culture lag with the 
maladjustment between the development of the automobile and the highways in 
America. While in 1910 both parts were functioning properly together (cars were 
slow, highways were narrow) the development of stronger motors enabled 
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speeds of 60, 70 and even 80 mph - but only in theory. In praxi, the narrow and 
curvy streets just did not allow to go at that speed they lagged behind and 
slowed down traffic's development It took the government some time to adjust 
the highways' quality to the new innovations in the automobile sector and thus to 
enable car owners to extract maximum utility from their cars (in terms of speed); 
see Ogburn (1957/1964). 
The time of maladjustment or imbalance within a culture is marked by social 
unrest and adjustment problems in society. 
This is exactly what can be observed in the sphere of tax culture during 
transformation or reform processes (Martinez-Vazquez & Wallace (2000: 12): 
"Reforming a tax code is a difficult and complex procedure, and it requires 
support and compatibility with other laws and institutions in the system"). 
In chapter three of the different elements of a national tax culture like the tax 
code, the tax authorities, tax experts, or the taxpayers have been identified. Tax 
culture lags may occur similar to cultural lag effects when the different elements 
of a nation's tax culture develop at different speeds, i.e. if for some reason the 
relationship between some parts is no longer in cultural/evolutionary equilibrium. 
This might be due to, e.g., a democratically legitimized tax reform. First, tax 
authorities will have to cope with the new guidelines and tax laws. Then, it is 
taxpayers who have to adjust their behavior to the latest changes in the tax law. 
During this period of multi-level adjustment tax-cultural distortions are inevitable 
especially in the case of a prevailing (tax) cultural conservation or inertia. 
On the hand of the tax officials decrease in working moral might be expected, 
followed by a decrease in tax moral on the part of the taxpayers. 
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In Western societies most tax reforms consist of marginal changes to the tax 
system online e.g. broadening some tax base, changing some tax rate by a 
percentage point, and so forth. 
In those cases, tax culture lags are neither very obvious nor serious, even though 
they appear, however. E.g., the introduction of the possibility to deduct some sort 
of expenses from personal income tax liability will change taxpayers' behavior in 
the medium term. Getting used to it takes some time of adjustment, as well with 
taxpayers as with taxmen. 
More serious are tax culture lags in the case of far reaching tax reform measures 
as can be observed in many transformation economies. There, grave tax culture 
lags occurred (See Nerre (2001 d, e). Far reaching tax reforms take place in 
Western societies as well, but are by far rarer than gradual reforms). 
Some-times people had to get accustomed to the reality of democracy, i.e. that 
having democratic rights means to have obligations, too. 
The most important one is especially in the case of scarcity in public funds 
paying taxes to finance the democratic institutions and keep the state in a 
position to fulfill its task of supplying certain public goods to its citizens 
appropriately. 
Thus, the gains from democratization and transformation can only be achieved in 
the long run if people obey and comply with the tax law. But, in fact, the majority 
of the people were of the opinion that they had never paid taxes before (due to 
hidden methods of taxation e.g. in socialist countries). Changing the 
"programming of the mind" in transformation economies will take strong 
puncational efforts (Comp. Cortazar Velarde (2000) and MinTax RF (2000). 
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and above all a long time. During the time of adjustment to the new (tax) reality 
the tax systems in these countries will generally not yield the necessary amount 
of revenue. 
Thus, changing a tax code without taking into consideration its embeddedness in 
the national tax culture might cause serious revenue problems and frustration of 
the actors, which might initiate a vicious cycle of non-compliance: on the one 
hand, the economic and political situation may not put the governments of 
transition countries into a position to fulfill their tasks satisfactorily. On the other 
hand, taxpayers do therefore not feel the moral obligation to fulfill their part of the 
institutional contract between the state and its citizens. Accordingly, as taxpayers 
receive public assistance only on an insignificant level, they think it legitimate to 
delay payments or entirely evade taxes. 
It has to be emphasized that it might be hard to distinguish the negative effects of 
a tax culture lag from those caused by a tax culture shock. It is of importance to 
note, though, that lags can hardly be avoided, even if a gradualist approach has 
been chosen as a method of reforms. 
2.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Hopefully, the theory of tax culture will be able to belittle the above-mentioned 
gap between pure theoretical economic fiction and cultural reality, particularly in 
the sphere of taxation. Furthermore, tax political recommendation can be derived 
from it, especially in the context of transformation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. CASE STUDIES OF TAX CULTURE LAG 
3.1. THE CASE OF RUSSIA 
The Russian case study undertaken by Nerre, Birger(2001d), (At present, the 
case study is not yet finished conclusively) presented is twofold: Its first part 
briefly analyses the history, development and status quo of Russian tax culture 
(3.1.1), whereas the second part takes a look at recent tax reform measures 
undertaken in the Russian Federation (3.1.2). 
3.1.1. RUSSIAN TAX CULTURE 
At this point, a presentation of all historical or technical details of the Russian tax 
culture is not strived for. Further details can be found in my "Steuerreformen and 
Steuerkultur in Rutland". 
While in 1805 one could still observe an approximate balance between revenues 
from direct and indirect taxation (Cf. Wagner (1910: 472), already in 1855 
indirect taxes amounted to a share of 72 per cent of total tax revenue (Compare 
Vilkov (1929: 301). 
This tendency to a dominance of indirect taxes has persisted through the whole 
Soviet period (Compare e.g. Holzman (1958) and is still prevailing in the Russian 
Federation. Within the sphere of indirect taxes the tax on alcoholic beverages 
has played a strikingly dominant role in the history of Russian taxation since the 
17 th century. Wagner (1910: 476) even called it "the pillar of Russia's public 
finances" (Translation and emphasis added: BN). 
In the 1980s, the revenue share of taxes on alcoholic beverages was still approx. 
20 per cent (Compare Lopez-Claros & Alexashenko (1998: 4, Note 4). 
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It dropped significantly after the 1985 anti-alcohol campaign of the Gorbatchev 
government. 
Even more important was a further heritage from Soviet taxation, namely the 
complete lack of transparency (Martinez-Vazquez & Wallace (2000: 11): "the 
population at large was neither aware of taxes nor had any perceptions of tax 
burdens") on the one hand and the weak tax administration system( See 
Highfield & Baer (2000) for a discussion of reform measures for the Russian tax 
administration) on the other hand. 
Under the socialist regime in Russia "collection" of "taxes" took place mainly on 
the "enterprise"-level (with approximately 98 per cent of the Soviet enterprises 
being state-owned). As the state had played „the role of both taxpayer and tax 
collector" (Lopez-Claros & Alexashenko (1998: 12) in the enterprise sector for 
over 70 years, the taxation of enterprises to a large degree was very arbitrary. 
Firms had to transfer between zero and one hundred per cent of their "revenues" 
to the state budget (Lopez-Claros & Alexashenko (1998: 12). 
As a result, the payment of taxes was an unpredictable variable in the 
management process. Rapidly changing tax laws and frequent tax concessions 
have conserved this circumstance in the last decade. Accordingly, a huge volume 
of tax arrears can be observed in the Russian Federation, which amounted to 5.5 
per cent of GDP in 1996. Their development was additionally fostered by the so-
called "30/70-rule" which allowed certain firms to use a fixed amount of 30 per 
cent of their revenues for wage and salary payments, regardless if in doing so 
they could not fulfill their tax obligations (Vgl. Lopez-Claros & Alexashenko (1998: 
8und 19). 
Dealing with the arrears' settlement, the widespread practice of paying "in kind" 
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(i.e. by transferring goods to the state instead of cash) has evolved in post 
Soviet-Russia. The tax authorities are offered, e.g., a shipment of shoes, which 
are intentionally overvalued (up to twice the market price) by bribed tax officials. 
By that means, tax arrears are illegally "settled" by corrupt measures. 
Interestingly, from a tax cultural viewpoint, paying taxes „in kind" has always 
been an important part of Russian taxation practice (Compare e.g. Holzman 
(1955: 82 ff. and 1958: 104 ff.)-
Until 1923 peasants in Russia were taxed exclusively by transfer, in kind". Even 
in Soviet times, they had to deliver agricultural goods to the state at a price below 
producer costs as one part of their tax duties. Accordingly, setting tax arrears "in 
kind" is a tax culturally conform method of payment to the Russian people. 
Concerning personal income taxes, Russians tax culture shows a clear tendency 
according to the dominance of indirect taxation in the Russian history of taxation: 
PIT has not been an important means of raising revenue. Initially, a PIT had been 
exclusively levied on land owners. In 1820, though, the income tax had been 
abolished until its reintroduction in the 1920ies (Holzman (1958:100) dates the 
PIT's introduction back to 1920, Hedtkamp (1959/60) deviates from this point of 
view/name 1920 as the year of reintroduction). 
In 1925, the function and intention of personal income taxation was redefined. 
From then on, the rate scheme of the PIT was designed to be a fierce weapon of 
class conflict. Ordinary workers and salaried employees were favored by tax 
rates ranging from 5.5 % to 13 per cent According to Holzman (1958: 102), 
about 98 per cent of the subjects to income tax fall in the category of workers and 
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salaried employees. A significant portion of those 98 per cent were taxed at 13 
per cent. Landowners and proletarians, on the contrary, were subject to 
discriminating tax rates of up to 65 per cent in 1943 (Holzman (1958: 102). 
However, revenues from PIT have constantly been less than ten per cent of total 
revenues. 
Struggles between different layers of government (especially between federal 
and regional budgets) have been caused by the fact that they share a significant 
proportion of tax revenues, particularly those from VAT and profit taxes 
(Compare Treisman (2000a: 5). 
The concrete distribution of the shares is set annually by budgetary laws (See 
Treisman (2000a: 6), but the property rights on those taxes mentioned above are 
practically not enforceable in the way prescribed by the law. Regions have tried 
to secure their own financial needs at the costs of those of the central budget by 
holding back collected taxes which belong to the central budget. Additionally, it 
seems to be common practice that "in return for bribes, regional governments 
offer to protect enterprises against central tax collectors". Treisman (2000a,b) 
and Berkowitz & Li (1999) assume that this struggle of competences has been a 
key factor explaining the accumulation of tax arrears in the Russian Federation. 
In any case, the impossibility to enforce property rights (tax rights) granted by the 
law seems to be an important element of Russian tax culture. 
At first glance, another very special feature of Russian tax culture seems to be 
the Federal Tax Police Service (Federal'naya sluzhba nalogovoi politsn), which 
was established in July 1993 to intensify tax collection and increase overall tax 
revenue. On second thoughts, though, one comes across well-established similar 
organizations in Italy (Guardia di Finanza) and The Netherlands (FIOD). 
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But still, the Russian tax police and especially its methods of task fulfillment 
(armed raids on firms and private homes) are definitely something special. Just 
recently, the range of activities of the tax police has been reduced significantly, 
though: it may not hold tax audits from now on 
Just recently, a reformed and simplified tax code has been passed by the Duma. 
It aims at the mitigation of the above-mentioned problems prevailing in the RF. 
Already during the process of drafting the new tax code for Russia, severe 
problems concerning the sphere of tax culture arose. Accordingly, tax cultural 
lags and/or tax culture shocks could be observed. 
3.2 TAX REFORM MEASURES IN THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS 
After the breakdown of the socialist regime, sufficiency of tax revenue became a 
central problem of public economics, while at the same time the revenue itself 
dropped significantly, in part due to the massive privatization of formerly state-
owned enterprises. Additionally, just like the willingness to pay taxes (tax 
compliance), the enforcement of the complex and chaotic Russian tax code was 
fairly weak in the times of perestroika. 
The way to a comprehensive tax reform in Russia has been hard and rocky. 
Several draft tax codes have been presented to the Duma, at least one of them 
the Shatalov draft influenced by international experts, others being coined by 
interest groups, Russian-specific needs and practices. From 1991 on, the law on 
"The Basic Principles of Taxation" (subject to numerous amendments, though) 
had served as a deficient substitute for a completely new and comprehensive tax 
code. "The resulting tax system gave Russia a reputation as one of the worst 
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examples of tax reform in transition" and "created a taxpayer culture of mistrust of 
government and non-compliance that endures". 
Finally, after the Duma had passed the first part of the new tax code in 1998 
(effective by January 1, 1999, significantly amended in July, 1999), the second 
part (chapters 21-24) was approved in 2000 and became effective by January 1, 
2001. At present, there are approximately 40 various taxes in the Russian 
Federation, among them a VAT, a profit tax, a unified social tax, certain excise 
taxes (e.g. on alcohol, tobacco, oil and petrol), a personal income tax and 
regional sales taxes. 
The VAT has a regular rate of 20% and a reduced one of 10% for foodstuff and 
goods for children. In the tradition of the long-time dominance of indirect taxation 
in Russia, a VAT certainly is a tax-culturally conform to Russian circumstances, 
as well as regional sales taxes (up to five per cent), which share the tax base 
with the VAT. Equally conform are the excise taxes, even though most taxpayers 
are not aware of paying them. 
Problems will most probably arise, however, in the context of the profit tax, which 
is applied to all firms at a uniform rate of 35 per cent. As mentioned above, tax 
collection on the enterprise level used to be the rule in Soviet times but on a very 
arbitrary basis. During the transformation process, frequent tax concessions 
instead of consequent punishments for not fulfilling one's tax obligations have 
created a hostile environment of mistrust and opposition especially in the sphere 
of enterprise taxation. 
Thus, taxing the enterprise sector might be the most difficult and the most crucial 
part of the ongoing reform processes. 
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The unified social tax is subject to a regressive taxation schedule ranging from 
35.6 % to 2 % (when the overall wage sum approaches infinity). Given the 
catastrophe of the breakdown of the Russian pension system (inherited from the 
Soviet union) in the cause of accelerating inflation in the 1990ies which could and 
can be observed by everyone living in Russia, social taxes are most probably 
causing that special feeling of being robbed by the state. Without knowing any 
solution to this dilemma, tax authorities should definitely be aware of the 
problems caused by the current solution. 
The personal income tax is levied on the majority of income sources at a flat rate 
of 13 per cent. Exemptions from that practice include income from certain 
sources (esp. dividends and royalties) and the income of foreigners living in the 
Russian Federation (regardless of its source). Despite the fact that most 
Russians should be used to paying income taxes amounting to about 13 per cent 
of their incomes, compliance levels are considerably low. As far as I see it, the 
relationship of the individuals to the state has changed dramatically. 
During Soviet times, the state seemed to care for its citizens by providing public 
goods and by heavily subsidizing the necessary private goods, like foodstuff and 
clothing. 
Thus, a perception of the benefit principle (in the sense of a do between 
taxpayers and the state) seems to be deeply and subconsciously rooted in 
Russian tax culture. During the transformation process, the economic and 
political situation did not put the Russian state into a position to fulfill its tasks 
satisfactorily. 
Taxpayers do not feel the moral obligation to fulfill their part of the institutional 
contract between the state and its citizens as long as the state does not fulfill its 
part in a proper way. 
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Accordingly, as they do only receive public assistance on an insignificant level, 
taxpayers think it legitimate to delay payments or entirely evade taxes. Therefore, 
Russian authorities face a vicious circle: without having an adequate amount of 
financial resources they cannot provide a proper level of public goods, but 
without providing them, tax revenues will be insufficient from the government's 
point of view. This argumentation seems to be valid in the context of enterprise 
taxation as well. 
3.3. CASE STUDY: TAX CULTURE SHOCK IN JAPAN 
3.3.1. THE JAPANESE TAX CULTURE 
In the following section both constitutional elements of the Japanses tax culture 
shall be examined: the specific cultural features and the historical development of 
the tax system. 
3.3.1.1. CULTURAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF JAPAN 
Japanese society is very different from the Western ones with regard to culture 
values. Every Westerner who has contact with Japanese people will state that 
they are 'somewhat different'. The roots for this difference can be found in the 
Japanese culture, which is deeply embedded in history. The most important, 
empirically well founded explanations of national culture are those of Geert 
Hofstede. He found four dimensions along which nationally divergent cultural 
patterns might be ranked in comparison: individualism, collectivism, power 
distances, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity vs. femininity. According to his 
empirical findings, Japan ranks as a collectivist, masculine, uncertainty avoidant 
and medium power distant country. 
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Historically, the Tokugawa era (1603 - 1867) plays an important role in 
explaining some Japanese cultural features. The emergence of the Japanese's 
high degree of hierarchical though may be dated back to those time when the 
rulers successfully installed a system of social ranking in the form of a strictly 
hierarchical class structure. 
Furthermore, Confucianism with its values benevolence, property wisdom, 
obedience, and the five wu lun was imported to aid the structuring of the society 
according to social classes, showing even more rigidity with regard to seniority in 
Japan than in China. Not only as a method to conserve the status quo, the 
system was introduced. This control mechanism means house or household and 
may be called family principle as well. It is assigned a far higher importance to 
than kinship. The " house" consists of a house head and many limbs. In fact, the 
house is a concept of frame, not of attribute. Japanese social life and 
organizational practice as well, are making it a network concept, where one large 
house consists of a large number of smaller houses. 
Thus, i.e. became dominant in the context of economic action as well (zaibatsu). 
Assuming the (HARMONY) within the group was the major task for any group 
leader. 
In the 19th century, the Tokugawa feudalism, which had the nation sealed off from 
the rest of the world by certain strict laws, became weaker as its leaders, the 
samurai, degenerated more and more. This development culminated in the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868. The feudal power of the shogunates was abolished by the 
return to direct governance by the emperor, which had been Japan's traditional 
political system. Shintoism, with the emperor as the central point, was instituted 
as the state religion. Remarkably, the restoration was undertaken by the elite, 
i.e. the governing circles. 
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They preached that individualism and individual freedom were a contradiction to 
Japanese tradition and virtues. The Meiji leaders manifested their power through 
a well-equipped army; national defense became one of the most important 
political (and budgetary) issues, which was emphasized by the political slogan 
"Fokoku Kyoker", meaning "a wealthy land and a strong army". In order to create 
a social climate of self-sacrifice for the state and dedication to it, the Meiji 
ideology proclaimed the uniting aim to catch up with the West. 
Another special feature of the Japanese culture, which seems to be decisive in 
the Japanese tax culture as well, is the 'face' concept, which emerged from the 
wu lun and the concept of i.e. during the Meiji period. From the Japanese 
standpoint it is of major importance to keep one's face because otherwise 
through any form of behavior deviating from the norm a loss of social capital is 
inescapable. In fact, social capital is the deciding factor for one's relative position 
and status in society. 
As private capital was sluggish to pick up industrialization, the government was 
forced to initiate the Japanese industrialization. Wakon-yosai (Japanese spirit 
and Western knowledge) the extensive adaptation of Western Technology (the 
so-called copy cat strategy) led to immense technological progress in the Nippon 
economy. Finally, in 1880, the Meiji leaders decided for several reasons to sell 
the majority of the government owned enterprises to wealthy and influential 
families at a marginal price. Subsequently, these families were able to use their 
advantage to form huge financial and industrial conglomerates based on the 
concept of organization, the zaibatsu. 
In the early 20thcentury, social unrest and high labor fluctuation marked Japan. 
Thus when Japan was hit by the world wide economic crisis in the late 1920's it 
suffered very hard. 
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To overcome these problems, lifetime employment and the seniority payment 
system were introduced as strategic tools to gain control of both the unrest and 
the fluctuation. 
3.4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM 1887 - 1945 
A SHORT OUTLINE 
The initial point for the inauguration of a "modern" tax system in Japan can be 
dated back to the year 1887. In the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration (s.a.) the 
national government succeeded in establishing an income tax with progressive 
rate ranging from one to three per cent. In the beginning, it was only of minor 
importance with regard to its share of the total tax revenues (in 1888 approx. 1.5 
per cent with approx. 12,000 taxpayers). The lion's share of total revenue until 
1908 was collected by the land tax (53.8 per cent in 1888), followed by indirect 
taxes (above all the liquor tax and the Tabasco tax). 
In 1940 an overall tax reform was carried out in ore to raise the funds necessary 
for financing the war activities. The former tax system, based mainly on indirect 
taxes, was redesigned as one being based on direct taxation. Additionally, the 
former single income tax was split up into a personal income tax and a business 
income tax. During World War II, taxes as such fell behind government bonds as 
a source of wartime finances. 
The main stages of the development of the Japanese tax system are 
summarized in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
TIME BOARD OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM UP TO 
THE SHOUP MISSION 
1887 
1899 






Introduction of the income tax (revenue in 1888 approx. 1,5%). 
Introduction of the scheduler income tax, corporate income 
taxation and withholding tax on capital gains. 
Land tax is the most important tax 
Indirect taxes (mainly on alcohol and tabacco) are the most 
important taxes 
Income tax becomes the most important revenue source 
Ax reform due to rising need for wartime finances for WWII 
• Direct taxes are placed at the center of the tax system 
• Income tax is split up into an individual and a business 
income tax(18% flat rate) 
Extraordinary tax program 
Shoup Mission 
According to the collectivist character of the Japanese society, the longing to 
have a harmonic distribution of the tax burden (which is embodied in the wa or 
harmony concept) can be noticed throughout the whole development of the tax 
system. Even nowadays, the taxpayer's personal situation is taken into account 
when calculating his income tax debt. 
Thus, from a Western point of view, the enforcement of the tax laws in Japan was 
very poor. Until November 1947, not a single case of tax fraud was made public, 
with the tax debtor being sentenced or fined. 
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"Punishment for tax evasion was contrary to the Japanese philosophy of justice" 
(Shavell 1948a: 139) and "contrary to Japanese ethics" (Shavell 1948b: 140). 
Instead of this the "face" institution operated as a control mechanism: Making a 
bad impression on tax authorities by failing to pay the right amount of taxes led to 
high loss of social capital. 
3.5. THE TAX CULTURE SHOCK AFTER WW II 
After the pre-war reform of 1940 had already caused sharp changes in the 
Japanese tax system. Japan was hit by a tax culture shock on the macro level in 
the aftermath of World War II. 
The first reform was triggered by the occupying forces in 1946 in the course of 
the so-called "extraordinary tax program ". First of all, brief overview on the after 
war events in Japan shall be given to achieve a embeddedness within the 
historical context. 
3.5.1. THE POLITICAL EVENTS AND ECONOMIC SITUATION AFTER THE 
WAR 
On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces and agreed to the 
Potsdam Declaration. The signing of the capitulation documents followed aboard 
the American warship "USS Missour" in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. 
During the war, Japan had lost more than 1,850.000 people, one third of them 
had died in air strikes in Japan itself, 40 per cent of the Japanese municipal 
areas and 2,25 million buildings were destroyed. 
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The occupying troops under General MacArthur, which stayed in Japan until 
April28, 1952, had two major aims for Japan: demilitarization and 
democratization. 
Due to the anti-monopoly law of 1947 a formal destruction of the zaibatsu was 
inevitable, but the informal bonds between the firmer zaibatsu members could in 
fact not be destroyed that easily. In the same year the new constitution ("Mac 
Arthur's Constitution"), which had been drawn up at the instigation of the 
Americans, was inaugurated. It replaced the old constitution of the Meiji 
Restoration of 1889. Under the surveillance of the occupiers the conception of 
sovereignty of the people was embodied in the constitution, which guaranteed 
the basic rights to every citizen explicitly and in a perfectly clear way. 
3.5.2. THE EXTRAORDINARY TAX PROGRAM OF 1946 
The legislative authorities had shown an inexhaustible perseverance to keep the 
taxation at its status quo (true to Canard's principle "Old taxes are good taxes") 
despite Japanese academic circle vehemently calling for taxation programs for 
some decades. But in 1946 the Allied Forces put pressure on a fast tax reform. 
The great scope and the rapidity of the changes to come were probably unique in 
(economic history). 
In the course of the so-called "extraordinary tax program" and the accompanying 
measures the Japanese tax system was turned inside out completely from 
September 1946, to March 1947. The program was based mainly on the 
suggestions of Leo Cherne and his assistance Charles J Siegel, who were 
obligated by the War Ministry to guide a tax reform conform with the American 
occupants' aims of demilitarization and democratization in May, 1946. 
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They were confronted with the following three main problems: 
1. The prevailing tax system fell short of its financial function and made up 
only for 11,3 per cent of national income and 31,1 per cent of government 
expenditure in 1946. 
2. Furthermore, the tax system was only insufficiently grounded on ability to 
pay principles, which became apparent especially with respect to the (to 
Western eyes) extremely arbitrary levy and enforcement of the personal 
income tax. 
3. Japan's tax system was inflexible with regard to the rapid economic 
changes, most important of all the accelerating hyperinflation. 
3.5.2.1. MEASURES AND ACCOMPANYING MEASURES OF THE 
EXTRAORDINARY TAX PROGRAM 
The extraordinary tax program consisted mainly of two components: a capital 
levy on wealth and war indemnity taxes. It was designed to reduce the Japanese 
domestic debt (government war bonds), to raise funds for the immense after war 
expenses and to achieve a correction/redistribution of wealth in Japan. In 
particular, the program was supported by the following measures to achieve 
higher tax productivity, slow down inflation, and to distribute the taxation burden 
more equitably: 
1. higher and more progressive personal income taxes with few exemption 
(and thus broad coverage) and a shift to a "pay as you go" basis with self 
assessment, 
2. higher excess profits and corporate taxes, which did now allow for an 
adjustment of depreciations to the hyper inflationary tendencies, and 
3. an increase in the number and the rates of sales and excise taxes, 
connected with the introduction of turnover tax (cascade tax) with a tax 
rate of one per cent. 
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The Japanese capital levy aimed above all at the wealthiest two or three per cent 
of the Japanese society, first and foremost the owners of the old zaibatsu. About 
43,5 billion Yen were raised which exceeded the overall tax revenue of the fiscal 
year 1946 - 1947 by about 20 per cent and equaled about 9 per cent of the total 
privately owned property according to data from March, 1946. Nevertheless, the 
non-fiscal intention of the levy was emphasized. Moreover, the capital levy was 
explained by moral and social political reasons, namely to aid the establishment 
of democratic institution in Japan. 
The war indemnity tax consisted of a partial repudiation of government bonds 
being issued during the war. To avoid the stigma of repudiation in the narrower 
sense, a 100 per cent tax on bonds was levied directly at source. Thus, about 90 
billion Yen could be raised. In order to keep the dispossession in line with the 
wa-concept, minor exemption were granted to small savers. 
Finally, on December 1, 1947, the "non war sufferer special tax" was introduced. 
It consisted of a house tax and a personal tax aimed at those properties had not 
been damaged or destroyed during the war. The rates were nominally high (300 
per cent of the rent value of houses), but were justifiable in real term 
3.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Even though I have not finished my Japanese case study yet, it has become 
apparent that the transfer of American tax ideals to Japan caused a tax culture 
shock on the macro level. However, some particular aspects still remain to be 
analyzed in more detail. After that, a statement on the Shoup Report will have to 
be made: Was it rather an instrument to mitigate the shock induced by the 
extraordinary tax program of 1946? Nevertheless, the incidents in Japan in the 




4. AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS: A CASE STUDY OF THE BIG 1896TAX 
REFORMS 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In old Europe, things took a bit longer and of course were a bit different: "No 
(over) taxation without evasion" could have been the catch-phrase for the 
Austrian tax culture in the 19 th century. The multinational subjects loathed the 
fiscalism of the monarchy, but it took the shift from absolute to constitutional 
monarchy and more than three decades of failed reform attempts to bring 
change: The reform of the direct taxes in 1896 is considered one of the 
greatest and most comprehensive tax reforms in the history of Austria. 
Before analyzing the influence of the country's tax culture on the tax reform (and 
wee versa!), we shall first give a brief account on the characterization of the 
political setting, the tax system and previous attempts to reshape the 
direct taxes. Subsequently, we shall sketch out some key elements of the 
Austrian tax culture at the end of the 19 th century and test them against an 
extended tax evasion model. 
Based on its results we shall argue that the success of the reform was 
substantially owed to the fact that it implicitly took tax-cultural aspects into 
consideration and that it attempted to change those elements of the Austrian tax 
culture, which had had detrimental effects on the amount of taxes the state 
collected. 
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4.2. THE POLITICAL SETTING AND THE AUSTRIAN SYSTEN OF DIRECT 
TAXES 
In 1867 the Habsburg monarchy was divided into the double monarchy Austria-
Hungary. Both parts formed a union and only defense and foreign policy were still 
common policies. Austria had its own constitution, administration and legislation 
and, as a corollary, its own tax competence. Political power was divided between 
the parliament, which consisted of two chambers, and the monarch. 
The Austrian state was organized in three levels, the federal government, the 
states and the local communities, which all had their own budgets and certain 
tax competences. The ongoing attempts of the Habsburg Monarchy to be a major 
player on the stage of European politics led to continuing financing problems of 
the budget. Consequently, the state's fiscal interest had always been the main 
impetus behind the design and reform of the tax system. At the beginning of the 
19 th century the monarchy-introduced taxes on business profits (1812), ground 
rents (1817), and house rents (1820). 
In 1849 this system of profits taxes was supplemented by the so-called "income 
tax", which in fact was much more a tax on business profits, labor income and 
interest yields. The main source of income for the states and communities were 
surcharges mostly on the direct taxes. This system virtually remained intact until 
the fundamental tax reform of 1896. All previous reform attempts were partial or 
complete failures; the introduction of a personal income tax in particular never 
succeeded even though it had been on the reform agenda since 1863. One of 
the main reasons for this was the fact that owing to the continual budget deficits 
the reform suggestions always aimed at getting higher tax revenues and 
consequently encountered fierce 
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opposition from the taxpayers, public opinion and parliament, which feared a 
higher tax burden. 
4.3. PARTICULAR FEATURES OF THE AUSTRIAN TAX CULTURE 
The particular features of the contemporary Austrian tax culture were a 
predominance of the fiscal interest of the state, comparatively high tax rates, 
exemptions from the tax base and tax authorities abusing a high degree of 
discretion. There was a general consensus that the tax burden was too high and 
distributed unequally. Consequently, people deeply distrusted the tax 
policies of the government. Not only was tax evasion widespread and socially 
accepted but even partially supported by the tax authorities. 
4.3.1. THE RESULT OF GOVERNMENT ACTION: HIGH TAX BURDEN, HIGH 
TAXES RATES AND TAX EXEMPTIONS 
Throughout the contemporary economic literature, the tax burden of the 
Austrians was considered as being extraordinarily high and pressing in absolute 
terms as well as in comparison to other European countries such as, for 
example, Prussia. Especially the high rates of the direct taxes were seen as 
detrimental. On top of the tax rates set by the Austrian federal government came 
the surcharges of the states and communities, which roughly doubled the burden 
of direct taxes. MYRBACH spoke of the "well-known Austrian tax screw which 
normally was only ever tightened [...]", and MENGER stated that the overall tax 
burden was by far higher than LEROY-BEAULIEU's "proportion exorbitant", i.e. 
a tax burden of more than 12-14% of income. According to MENGER, the level 
of the direct tax rates in Austria sounded "unbelievable" to foreigners. The 
government itself regarded the business taxes as extraordinarily high. WIESER , 
who called the direct taxes "irrational" 
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because of their unequal distribution and the "crass level" of the tax rates 
compared the per capita burden of the direct taxes of Austria and Prussia around 
the turn of the century and came to the conclusion that it was roughly 50% higher 
in Austria. The unequal distribution of the direct taxes was acknowledged even 
by high-ranking civil servants dealing with the reform. 
To ease the tax burden, the state granted exemptions from the tax base. The 
taxes on houses were cushioned by a 12 year exemption for new building 
projects. The tax on interest yields left the greatest part of the capital de-facto 
tax-free. Also, certain businesses were not obliged to pay taxes or got arbitrary 
tax reductions. The tax base of the ground tax was based not on the actual 
ground rent but on the average ground rent fixed in the land register in 
1869, therefore the relevant tax base was usually much lower than the actual tax 
base. 
4.3.2. THE TAX AUTHORITIES: BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY AND 
ARBITRARINESS 
The tax authorities' prosecution of tax evasion was deficient, as tax penalty laws 
were incomplete, lax and hardly effective. SIEGHART spoke of an extensive 
freedom from prosecution and meager results of the criminal justice in finance 
matters. Moreover, the tax authorities, in view of the unbearable tax burden, were 
often even reluctant to enforce the laws in existence against tax evaders. 
According to MYRBACH, the tax authorities went as far as accepting even 
obvious tax evasion and only initiated prosecution if a whole source of 
taxable revenue was not declared. He identified a collaboration between tax 
authorities and taxpayer:"[...] no one, including the tax inspector, thought of 
putting the true and complete 'taxable income' into the forms." Instead, the tax 
base was reduced to make the final tax amount bearable. 
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The fixing of the tax base was at the discretion of the tax authorities. 
The business tax law was so undetermined that the tax authorities had much 
room for discretion and abuse. They were virtually free to determine the tax sum 
a business had to pay. Formally, their discretion was limited by the existence of 
different tax classes. As there were no fixed criteria for the inclusion of a 
business in one class or another, however, the authorities assigned tax classes 
arbitrarily. Even worse, the taxpayer could not take legal action against these 
decisions as the administrative court refused to act on complaints. 
The amount of tax to be paid by a business therefore depended ultimately on the 
attitude and career aspirations of the tax inspector in charge. Arbitrary behavior 
of the tax authorities can also be found regarding the tax on houses: BEER 
recognized regional differences in the tax authorities' efforts both to find out the 
current rent and to prosecute the evasion of the original house-interest tax. 
4.4. THE TAXPAYERS: TAX MORALE AND TAX EVASION 
High marginal tax rates and arbitrary behavior of the tax authorities made the 
taxpayers distrust the tax state and caused high tax evasion. The latter was a 
"[...] normal phenomenon of Austrian tax life [...]". Indeed, the high rates led to 
the custom of reducing the tax base when income was declared. GROSS 
confirmed that tax fraud was not only seen as being "permitted" but as "a matter 
of course". This view was shared by AUSPITZ, who said it was the high rates that 
"[...] dug the grave for the Austrian tax morale [...]". WIESER and BEER 
saw indications that a relevant amount of the taxable income was not declared, 
and finance minister BRESTEL is quoted with the bon mot that every Austrian 
finance minister should be happy to get half of the tax receipts the taxpayers owe 
him.61 Unsurprisingly, finance minister STEINBACH called the tax on businesses 
"[...] the cradle of the tax lie", i.e. the Austrian government 
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themselves acknowledged that the high taxes on businesses led to tax evasion. 
WIESER claimed that there was a "pact" between the taxpayers, who openly 
evaded taxes, and the legislator, who willy-nilly accepted this behavior. 
4.5. TESTING SOME MODEL HYPOTHESES AGAINST THE AUSTRIAN 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4.5.1. AN EXTENDED TAX EVASION MODEL 
First evidence from a modified tax evasion model gives a partial explanation for 
low compliance rates in 19 th century Austria. The maximization of expected 
utility leads to the condition, that an individual taxpayer will only report his full 
income if the sum (or better: the perceived share) of public goods received 
and the product of fine rate and catch probability is larger than one less a tax-
cultural parameter: 
(1)ms + p f>1 - ? D 
?C 
m is a government multiplier that shows according to which proportion the tax 
returns are transferred into a public good supplied by the government. Stands for 
the perceived share of public good received by the individual, p is the probability 
of audit, and f the fine rate if caught cheating on the authorities. Let Ci denote a 
function that assigns a number? to any relative compliance level D/Y (declared 
tax base to real tax base) where? takes a positive sign for tax cultures where 
compliance is the norm and people suffer a psychological loss in 
expected income because of undisclosed taxes, whereas? has a negative sign 
for those tax cultures where evasion is the norm rather than the exception and 
taxpayers suffer a loss because of from a tax-cultural view "excessive" tax 
payments. The first derivative of Ci with respect to Di will be greater than zero in 
compliance-oriented societies and less than zero in evasion-oriented tax cultures 
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leading to an additional psychological profit to the individual if he underreports 
the tax base, p and s are defined in a range between 0 and 1, the fine rate 
and the multiplier can theoretically even exceed 1, Evidence about the value of 
the multiplier in 19 th century Austria does not really suggest a multiplier greater 
than one. 
The most important public good, which absorbed a great share of the tax 
revenues, was national security. Anecdotal evidence suggests, though, that 
administration was highly ineffective and thus a multiplier smaller than one. 
Concerning the share of public good received by the individual taxpayer, the old 
documents show no evidence at all. Given the high levels of tax evasion one 
might assume that the taxpayers were not satisfied with their share of public 
goods received. That would suggest a value of far smaller than one for s. 
The product ms would therefore have a value below 1. Low penalty rates and a 
low probability of audit and enforcement are stylized facts prevailing 
in 19 th century Austria, see above. Thus, the product pf is very small, and only 
slightly bigger than zero. Accordingly, the sum (ms + pf) is most probably even 
less than one. From the evidence in the literature under revision that has been 
cited and explained above, we can surely conclude, that Austria's tax culture at 
those times was highly evasion-oriented. In our model that would mean a 
negative sign for i? D, making it even harder to satisfy 
?C 
inequality (1). As we have seen from the evidence reported above, the prediction 
of our model under those circumstances, that nobody would pay his tax dues to 
the full amount, holds for the Austrian tax cultural environment at the end of the 
19 th century quite well. In a next step we want to analyze the amount of taxes 
evaded more thoroughly. Therefore, the concept of legitimacy of tax policy is 
introduced. 
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4.5.2 TAX RATES AND LEGITIMACY 
A government faces N policy issues connected with the taxation process. N-1 of 
those issues are all matters determined by the tax-cultural evolution. The N th 
issue the authorities have to deal with is the tax rate. According to LEROY-
BEAULIEU (1883), the tax rates should not exceed some 12 to 14 per cent of 
total income. In other words, there existed an informal rule, that the actual tax 
rate must not exceed a certain maximum or critical tax rate t *. If for 
some reason the government was to raise the tax rate above the critical level, its 
policy would lose its legitimacy. Obviously this was exactly the case before the 
great Austrian tax reform. 
We now introduce a legitimacy concept expanding the standard tax evasion 
model. Legitimacy consists of at least four determining dimensions: (a) reciprocity 
what does a taxpayer get for his money, (b) loyalty how does a taxpayer feel 
about the state and its policies, (c) simplicity how understandable and 
predictable is the tax system, and (d) fairness how is a taxpayer treated in 
comparison to other taxpayers. Formally speaking, a tax policy and here 
especially: a tax rate is completely legitimate (L = 1), if the Euclidean 
distance between the policy vector here: the tax rate chosen by the government 
and the policy vector desired by the taxpayer is zero. With rising distance, 
legitimacy vanishes and approaches zero: 
As long as the actual tax rate lies below the critical tax rate we will assume 
legitimacy to be one. Then, legitimacy starts to erupt according to the difference 
in the tax rates and a certain weighting parameter b, that values the importance 
of the specific tax rate in comparison to the other elements of the policy vector, 
e.g. other tax rates, enforcement probabilities etc. (the term 1/b + t * is exactly 
that value of t, where (t - 1 *) b = 1). 
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Thus, if t is fixed at a rate equal to or higher than 1/b +1 *, legitimacy of the 
government's policy is zero. By introducing dissonance costs to the model, 
legitimacy and tax compliance can be linked - including some tax-cultural 
parameters. Dissonance costs DC will appear in the individual's 
calculation if he violates a (tax-cultural) norm, that is if he deviates from generally 
accepted and supported compliance patterns. With G? [0, 1] we introduce a 
parameter showing the importance of tax compliance in a specific tax-cultural 
setting, and by g? [0, 1] we denote an individual's propensity to suffer from 
cognitive dissonances. 
Further, let y denotes the total income of the individual and t denotes the fraction 
of evaded income. Dissonance costs thus may be expressed as 
(3) DC = GgtyL 
Thus, if G, g or the current legitimacy of government's policy are zero, an 
individual will not suffer psychologically from deviating from his due tax debts. 
For the risk-neutral individual expected punishment from tax evasion activities will 
be determined by the probability of audit p and a certain fine F, that has been 
modeled with constant marginal punishment 
(4) F = (at)(ty) (with a » 0) 
(5)E(P) = pF = p(at2y). 
The expected costs of evasion E(C) equal the sum of expected punishment E (P) 
and dissonance costs DC: 
(6) E(C) = ty (pat + GgL) 
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The occurring costs have to be weighted against the expected utility from evasion 
if not caught 
(7)E(U) = (1-p)tty 
The individual's optimization taking cognitive dissonances into account thus 
becomes 
(8) 1 ? 0? max ty[(1 - p)t - pat - GgL] 
The solution to (8) is 
(9)? GgL 2p?p)t?(1? 
From this it becomes clear that a decreasing legitimacy will lead to an increase in 
tax evasion. Inserting the legitimacy values from (2) into the optimal rate of tax 
evasion (9) we get the following solutions: 
(a )0 t t??andpgLt? 1? 
(b) Gg 2p? p) t? (1? * 11? (i.e. L = 1) and 11? 1? ? [?] 
(10) t = (c) 12p? )) B(t p) t * ? gG (1 ? ? (1 ? * * t b 11? 1 and 11? 1 ? [?] 
(d) 2p?p) t (1? * t b t? 1 (i.e. L = 0) and t? 1? [?] 
(e)1 1 ? ? ? ? [ ? ] t t 
From our observation we can conclude, that t was neither 0 nor 1, which leaves 
three cases to be reviewed: 10b, 10c, and 10d. If we consider LEROY-
BEAULIEU's statement that the tax rates should not exceed some 12 to 14 per 
cent of total income we can assume that this informal rule has been violated in 
Austria, excluding 10b from our possible results (because legitimacy was 
significantly below one). 
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The remaining two equations differ by the legitimacy value. As for Austria, we 
cannot answer for sure if legitimacy was zero or slightly above zero. 
So we can only conclude that Austria was somewhere between the values 
derived in 10c and 10d. (11) r 2p? )) b (t p)t * ? gG(1 ?? (1 ? Austria? 2p? p)t (1 ?) 
Given this situation any tax reform attempt would have had to tackle the low 
legitimacy of tax rates (and tax policy in general) to lower tax evasion 
significantly. That was exactly how the fathers of the big 1896 reform proceeded, 
as will be described in detail in the subsequent section. 
4.6. THE BIG TAX REFORMS 1896 
The proposal for the general reform of the direct taxes was brought into the 
parliamentary process in 1892, was finally accepted in 1896 and came into effect 
in 1898. The reform combined a general overhaul of the existing direct taxes 
with the introduction of a personal income tax. The latter was the heart and 
cornerstone of the reform; it paved the way to taxation according to the ability to 
pay principle. The reform proposal was worked out by EUGEN VON BOHM-
BAWERK and ROBERT MEYER, both eminent representatives of the 
Austrian School and leading civil servants in the Ministry of Finance. 
4.7. AIMS OF THE REFORMS 
The first aim of the reform was to shape the tax system according to a general 
principle of justice: the ability to pay. The superimposition of the personal income 
tax on the old profits taxes made a taxation of the tax subject's complete income 
and thus according to their ability to pay possible. In contrast, the previously 
uneven distribution of the tax burden had been due to the unconnected taxation 
of different tax objects. While all previous reform attempts focused on fiscalism 
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and taxed the citizens according to COLBERT'S "goose-principle", the clou of this 
reform was the federal government's codified relinquishment of the collection of 
higher tax receipts. 
This scheme of federal tax restraint had the astonishing time horizon of 12 years. 
Any extra receipts were to be used to lower both the tax on businesses and the 
taxes on houses and ground by a considerable amount. The rest of the extra 
revenues were to be transferred to the states to improve their financial situation. 
In return for these transfers, the states agreed not to introduce surcharges on the 
personal income tax. 
This agreement prevented that the relatively low tax rates of the new personal 
income tax fixed by the federal government were spoiled through surcharges 
imposed by the states. The general tendency to achieve lower tax rates went 
hand in hand with a broadening of the tax base: For the first time every income 
regardless of its source was declared taxable income. 
The reformers knew, though, that good tax laws alone were not enough, their 
application in practice was crucial. Therefore they abolished the purely 
administrative procedure of tax collection and initiated a system of commissions 
in which the taxpayers could participate. The power to tax, which until then had 
been solely in the hands of the tax bureaucracy, was now divided between the 
bureaucracy and the commissions. 
The aim was to reduce the discretion of the tax authorities especially regarding 
the collection of the taxes on businesses, and to bridge the gap between the tax 
authorities and the taxpayer through active cooperation of both. That way, the 
alienation of the taxpayer from the tax state was at least partly reduced. 
To reduce tax evasion tax penalty laws were tightened, but at the same time the 
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rights of the taxpayer were improved. While tax evasion was penalized with the 
threefold to ninefold of the evaded sum, taxpayers accused of tax evasion now 
had the right to be heard by the tax authorities and to defend themselves. 
They could also appeal to the tax authorities of the state and afterwards to the 
administrative court. The greater severity of the penalties aimed at giving an 
incentive against tax evasion, and the improved rights of the citizens were to 
attenuate the distrust against the tax state. 
All mentioned aims can be seen as suitable measures to improve the prerequisite 
for a better tax morale of the people and for changing the tax culture of the 
country. 
4.8. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORM 
We interpret the fiscal success of the reform, especially in the long run, as 
evidence for its favorable effect on the tax morale.97 During the 15 years after 
the tax reform the direct taxes grew at an average annual rate of 3.4%, whereas 
within the 15 years before the reform they grew at an average annual rate of 
1.9%. Despite the reductions of some of the tax rates the tax revenues grew at a 
much higher pace. 
The personal income tax rose at an average annual rate of 7.2% until 1913, i.e. it 
nearly tripled. Its share of the direct taxes grew from 14% in 1898 to 24% in 
1913. ROBERT MEYER noticed an improvement of the tax morale and linked it 
to the common conviction that the personal income tax was a fair one. He also 
pointed out that the commissions had a favorable influence on the tax morale. 
However, as various Austrian economists predicted, the change towards a lower 
tax evasion rate was very slow. 
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Sources of income with a low probability of being discovered were still not 
declared and the tax evasion penalties did only tardily bring the hoped-for 
deterrence. 
Nonetheless, the number of registered taxpayers rose from 2.8% of the 
population in 1898 to 5.4% in 1912, indicating a rising acceptance of the tax. 
In terms of our model the government ultimately succeeded in reducing the tax 
evasion rate (?). Because the reform was regarded as making the tax system 
fairer, improving the taxpayers' participation and their legal rights as well as 
containing the bureaucratic arbitrariness, it was psychologically more difficult to 
evade taxes i.e. (g) rose. For the same reasons, a rising importance of tax 
compliance (G) slowly developed. The tightening of the tax penalty laws and its 
stricter enforcement resulted in an (albeit small) rise of the probability of audit (p), 
which had previously been about zero. 
4.9. CONCLUSION 
We interpret the big tax reform of 1896 as a successful attempt to initiate a 
change of key elements of the Austrian tax culture. The architects of the reform, 
the well-known economists BOHM-BAWERK and MEYER, tamed the detrimental 
effects of key elements of the Austrian tax culture: Fiscalism, high tax rates, 
bureaucratic arbitrariness, unequal distribution of the high tax burden, distrust of 
the taxpayers and the socially accepted high tax evasion. 
They managed to cut through this Gordian tax knot with their reform and thereby 
paved the way for a long run change of the Austrian tax system and tax culture. 
The empirical evidence confirms the theoretical results of our tax evasion model: 
Greater fairness of the tax system, a more efficient tax administration and more 
rights for the taxpayers as well as a higher audit probability resulted in a higher 
legitimacy of the tax policy and ultimately in a lower tax evasion rate. 
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Although it is rather difficult to draw generally applicable conclusions for actual 
tax reforms, the 1896 reform had certain features that could be helpful for 
Nowadays' reforms, too: The reform was designed by leading civil servants who 
were experienced in practical tax problems as well as in economic theory. The 
reformers at least implicitly identified key elements of the Austrian tax culture and 
their measures aimed at improving the legitimacy of taxation. As the tax culture 
changes only slowly their focus rightly was the expected long-run effect of the 
Reform. 
Therefore they were prepared to accept sacrifices in the short run to harvest 
when the fruits were ripe. Nowadays politicians aiming at being reelected do not 
seem to have a sufficiently long time horizon to wait for the possible long-run 
gains of a change in the tax culture. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. CULTURE, TAX COLLECTION AND GOVERNANCE IN South Africa 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
WHY do South Africans pay tax? 
Can taxpayers behavior tell us anything about the way we are and how we 
should be governed? 
To many lay people and specialists, the answer is obvious and not very 
interesting. We pay because we have to pay. If tax payments increase, either 
because more citizens pay or because taxpayers pay more of what the law says, 
that is because the authorities have become better at forcing citizens to pay. In 
this view, the implications of tax collection for governance are straightforward: 
whether taxes are collected or not depends on whether the relevant authority is 
efficient enough to ensure that they are collected. 
Efficient collection depends on effective coercion since people will not pay 
voluntarily. Translated into a general point about governance, that shows that we 
obey the rules when the government does its job and ensures that the systems 
are in place to force us to comply. 
All of this sounds less like analysis than common sense. And that perhaps 
explains why trying to understand the dramatic increase in collections by the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS). Can be a frustrating business: few 
practitioners or analysts are willing to look beyond the common sense story, that 
SARS has become technically better at doing its job and that its ability to force 
people to pay has increased. 
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Why should that be a problem? 
Because, if we look at the issue a little more closely, there is no reason why 
SARS's performance should be seen as commonplace. Not only is it at variance 
with the widespread assumption that compliance is declining in post-apartheid 
South Africa; improvements in revenue raising are unusual internationally, so this 
is not a case of a South African government agency catching up with world 
trends. Nor is there any evidence that the tax collection technologies, which 
SARS is employing, are available only to it if it doing better than others with the 
same technologies, then something other than better machinery is at play. 
SARS's performance is currently the object of research at the Center for Policy 
Studies because it holds important lessons for our understanding of how state 
find the money they need to pay for their functions, and, more generally, of the 
elements of effective government. If we want to understand why this is so, we 
must begin by noting that the conventional approach to tax collection described 
here is in sharp contrast to the way in which the South African policy debate 
tends to view compliance with public obligations in other spheres of life. 
On issues such as payment of municipal service charges or obedience to the 
requirement that drivers take out a new form of license, to name but two, there is 
a lively public debate which assumes that the reasons why people comply or 
refuse to do are more complicated than the tax explanations suggest. Indeed, far 
from assuming that the desire not to comply is normal, many of the most vocal 
and articulate commentators take precisely the contrary view to that which is 
used to describe tax behavior they denounce the lack of morality and sense of 
civic obligation of those who do not comply. 
These two views, both regarded as common sense by many participants in the 
debate, are based on contrasting assumptions of human social behavior. 
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The 'common sense' view on tax assumes that people will evade their tax 
obligations if they can. Implicit here is the assumption that self-interest dictates 
non-compliance, whether or not we like the political system in which we live and 
those who govern it and so tax collection is simply a matter of ensuring that we 
cannot evade our duty. 
Those who frequently complain of declining standards of civic virtue assume that 
non-compliance is a form of deviant behavior that it sets us apart from others 
elsewhere. Behind this must lie the assumption that people tend to obey society's 
rules - presumably whether or not they are forced to obey. Here, if you like, 
humans become instinctive compilers, in the tax view they are instinctive non-
compliers. 
Citizen attitudes to compliance are hold implications well beyond the tax 
question. Even before our first universal franchise election in 1994 it became 
clear that ensuring that citizens comply with their public obligations would be one 
of the key challenges facing democratic government. 
Predictably, perhaps, that expectation has been vindicated the post-1994 
government has found that ensuring citizen compliance with obligations is among 
its more difficult tasks. In that context, the story of SARS's enhanced 
performance is a crucial subject of study in a context in which we are repeatedly 
told that levels of compliance are low, tax is one in which they are clearly 
increasing. 
Why this should be so is therefore a crucial question for researchers or 
practitioners who want to derive lessons for more effective governance. 
It is also worth noting that tax behavior would be an important issue even if 
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SARS had not proved so clear an exception to the rule of post-apartheid 
government. The capacity to tax is one of the key indicators of a state's ability to 
govern88. Recent analyses have also suggested that the extent to which states 
rely on taxes may also decide what sorts of states they are, since those who rely 
on collecting from their citizens are likely to be more responsive to those they 
govern than states which largely rely on rents from commodities such as oil or 
minerals or on foreign aid. 
Also, like other states in the global South, South Africa faces a significant 
challenge to reduce poverty not only does tax provide resources which would 
allow the government to do this; tax collection can in itself reduce inequalities by 
enabling the state to redistribute wealth through the tax system. For all these 
reasons, SARS's enhanced performance is crucial to our understanding of the 
prospects of South Africa's post-1994 democracy. And the question of why 
citizens or companies have been more inclined to meet their obligations is crucial 
to understanding SARS's successes and drawing the appropriate lessons from 
them. 
5.2. TAX COMPLIANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW 
One of the reasons why the conventional view of tax collection seems so self -
evident may be that many of its proponents assume that the only alternative is 
the other position presented here, one which portrays 'normal' tax-payers as 
enthusiastic compliers. In reality, neither is appropriate. 
The argument that tax collection is not purely a matter of coercion and that, 
therefore, more is required to ensure compliance than the use of efficient 
coercive strategies by taxing authorities is routinely misunderstood. Those who 
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insist that tax collection is simply a matter of management technique note that 
SARS has indeed enhanced its technical tax collection capacity through a variety 
of measures. 
They note too that enhanced tax collection follows the introduction of these 
measures. Logic would dictate that it is the measures, not some mysterious 
change in the attitudes of taxpayers, which has caused the change. Similarly, 
they might note that there is no evidence that tax payers have any reason to feel 
happier better about paying now than they did before SARS performance began 
improving indeed, what evidence we have suggests that SARS can be the 
subject of severe hostility from the tax practitioners or consultants on whom many 
affluent people rely to complete their tax returns and who have denounced the 
methods SAS uses to collect revenue. 
So if enthusiasm for tax paying has not increased, and vigorous enforcement 
has, the explanation seems obvious. Both of these arguments implicitly create a 
false dichotomy. Either, they imply, we assume that tax is paid by reluctant 
citizens who must be efficiently coerced - or we are obliged to propose some 
version of the diligent citizen assumed by those who complain of deficient civic 
morality. 
If, therefore, we cannot find evidence of people paying tax voluntarily because 
they feel they are contributing to a state with which they identify or a government 
program which they support, we must assume that people have been coerced 
into paying and that the compliance decision depends purely on a cost-benefit 
calculation in which the costs of punishment are weighed against the benefits of 
escaping tax. 
This excludes the possibility that the decision to pay may stem not from 
enthusiastic endorsement of the state but because payers are embedded in a set 
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of rules, values and relationships, which create a culture, which makes the 
decision to, pay taxes far more likely. If those elements are present, a technically 
efficient tax authority may be able to use the routines and attitudes, which 
underpin that culture to enhance collections. Efficiency may matter but only if a 
culture conducive to payment already exists. If that culture does not exist among 
taxpayers, then technical efficiency measures may have no effect. And it is also 
possible that, if increased technical efficiency is not based on an accurate 
Understanding of the culture among taxpayers, it may have no effect or it may 
reduce the effectiveness of tax collection. 
5.2.1 THE MORAL ECONOMY OF SHAME 
The argument is perhaps best introduced by examining a SARS tactic, which 
forms a significant element in its strategy the public embarrassment of 
individuals. People in public positions, we are told, are prosecuted for alleged tax 
misdemeanors amid much publicity because SARS believes that this will shame 
others into avoiding similar ignominy. 
This is routinely presented as a technically competent enforcement strategy 
because it sends a signal to recalcitrance that they will be apprehended, altering 
the cost-benefit calculation in favor of the tax collector. But that is not all that is 
happening, since SARS insists that 'embarrassment', not simply the application 
of the law, is a goal of the strategy. This raises an obvious question: why, if tax 
compliance is purely a matter of coercion, should anyone found not to have 
complied be embarrassed; there is surely no embarrassment in being found to 
have done something which everyone else does if they can. To insist that a 
suspected tax non-payer can be embarrassed is to assume that there is a 
culture, which would make this behavior appear shameful. 
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This is by no means automatic, since there are societies in which non-payment is 
not a cause of shame. Where there is a culture, which makes exposure of non-
payment a source of shame, a form of technical efficiency, which relies on 
shaming offenders, may be extremely effective. This argument has been made 
elsewhere. 
It is supported by, for example, subsequent interviews with tax practitioners, 
some of whom fiercely criticize SARS and are clearly at best skeptical about the 
post-apartheid order, but who insist also that morality dictates that citizens should 
pay tax. 
The example just cited illustrates an important aspect of taxpayer behavior which 
it may have nothing at all to do with enthusiasm for the state or its governing 
party. One important analysis of tax collection in South Africa and Brazil argues 
that compliance here may have originally been inspired by political loyalty but 
that the behavior may survive even after its cause has passed into history. In this 
view white South Africans were happy to pay for a state which protected them 
against a majority they perceived as threatening; this creates a set of habits 
which become, as it were, ingrained, so much so that they might survive the 
downfall of the state which inspired the habit and its replacement by one which 
many of the compilers may view with suspicion. 
This theory remains speculative. But its accuracy may be relatively unimportant 
to the argument made here because the insistence that tax paying depends on 
an underpinning culture does not depend on the claim that it stemmed originally 
from loyalty to a political order. It may well be that understandings derived from 
more complicated forces than identification with a system of government are 
instrumental in creating that culture. 
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5.2.2. PEOPLE LIKE US: CULTURAL EFFICIENCIES 
Before discussing this issue, it may be important to note that 'technical efficiency' 
is a less unambiguous term than many analyses assume. What, for example, are 
we to make of the observation by a tax practitioner that SARS is to be taken 
seriously because 'you are no longer dealing with the old-style civil servant with 
his flask of tea and sandwiches now the SARS people wear three piece suits 
and have worked for major accounting firms'? 
The point, of course, is that nothing is being said, at least directly, about the 
competence of the new type of tax collector we learn only that they have some 
cultural similarities with the tax practitioners, which their predecessors lacked. 
This raises an important point about understandings of technical competence. It 
may well be that the practitioner is attempting to convey, in a culturally coded 
way, that the new consultants are indeed more technically competent than their 
predecessors because people who work for large firms and dress accordingly are 
likely to be better able to extract resources from people skilled in tax avoidance. 
But the comment may also reveal the degree to which technical competence may 
simply be a code for cultural compatibility the practitioner does not, on the 
surface, say anything about competence: he stresses, rather, the degree to 
which the cultural fit between him and the SARS employee has increased But the 
statement may also mean both that the new breed of tax official is both more 
competent and culturally closer to tax practitioners. 
Part of SARS's strategy is premised on the understanding that effective tax 
collection requires a far greater understanding of the workings of particular 
sectors of industry than the tax collection agency has hitherto been able to 
achieve. 
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Implicit in this is the notion that competence is not simply a matter of forensic 
accounting technique it requires knowledge of how specific industries and those 
who work in them operate. The divide between technical competence and 
cultural understanding becomes blurred since the latter is an important 
component of the former: one of the elements of technical competence is an 
understanding of the culture of the companies and individuals from whom 
compliance is sought. 
Equally important is the network of rules and understandings, which underpin tax 
behavior. The first point, which seems apposite here, is that participation in the 
market economy may create appropriate conditions for certain types of 
compliance to become seen as routine. Clearly, the argument here is not that 
there is any necessary connection between the existence of formal markets and 
tax compliance. Brazilian taxpayers that are said to see the seeking of 
exemptions as a more appropriate response to tax assessments than payment 
also operate in a market economy. However, the point here is that market activity 
is not simply the exchange of goods and services by private owners. 
It is, as Douglass North among others has shown, embedded in rules, 
understandings and routines. And, while North's work is instructive precisely 
because it points us to the reality that these differ between market economies, it 
may well be that there are characteristics of market activity which make a culture 
of compliance more likely. 
That SARS has achieved its greatest efficiency gains with companies rather than 
individuals may, therefore, not be solely attributable to the reality that, given the 
relative size of firms and individuals' assets, companies are likely to be more 
cost-effective sources of revenue than people. It may also be related to the 
likelihood that the tax decision-making process is rather different in companies. 
They are far more rule-bound than individuals because they are composed of 
and engage with a variety of groups of people whose rights can be protected only 
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by ensuring that the activity is bound by rules. Firms and this point would 
obviously be emphasized the larger and more complex the company are forced 
to establish sets of rules to govern their internal workings and to engage with 
government agencies in a variety of rule-bound interactions (on import permits, 
tariffs, health and safety regulations and the like). It seems likely that this form of 
behavior creates patterns in which tax compliance is a more 'normal' option than 
evasion. 
To elaborate. SARS has used payrolls as a key source of information to secure 
greater compliance. But companies who seek to evade tax cannot do so by 
falsifying payrolls without jeopardizing their labor relations. Similarly, companies 
which misrepresent profits are negatively affecting shareholders and investors as 
well as the tax authorities both these constituencies may have as immediate an 
interest as the revenue gatherer in accurate record keeping and may in some 
cases have greater direct capacity to enforce it. 
Market activity forces companies into a variety of relationships, which rely on the 
sort of obedience to rules of disclosure, which make tax compliance easier to 
enforce. Individuals, even if they live in a rule-bound society, do not face the 
same pressures to disclose information and therefore have greater leeway to 
evade obligations. To this should be added the reality that firms, like large non-
profit organizations, find it more difficult to evade obligations simply because 
more people are required to participate in the act and there is an obvious 
possibility that one or more of them will refuse to co-operate. This ensures that 
organizations are more likely sources of compliance than individuals. As noted 
earlier, this does not mean that the factors discussed here mandate 
compliance - corporate scandals in the United States show that shareholders 
and workers can indeed be misled while in sub-Saharan Africa it is not 
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uncommon for large organizations, including some which are publicly owned, to 
evade their fiscal obligations. 
But it does create conditions for behavior, which makes compliance an easier 
option than its alternative; while in different environments, ranging from the 
informal through to that in which individuals decide whether or not to comply, the 
reverse may be the case. 
Similarly, we may find that individuals are more likely to be locked into a culture 
conducive to tax-paying the more habituated they are to particular forms of 
administrative routine more specifically, if they are used to interacting with the 
state through a set of rules which are seen to have two key characteristics: that 
they are not arbitrary and that there is a reasonable expectation that compliance 
will yield benefits - the extension of rights (such as a license to drive a vehicle) 
and entitlements (a pension or a subsidies place at a state school). It may also 
be that engagement with the state tends towards compliance if it is assumed, 
Over a fairly long period, to be capable of implementing its own rules. North 
points towards this when he stresses the role of institutions, or 'the rules of the 
game in a society' in shaping economic behavior. It seems plausible that 
individuals who are used to acting within rules which make compliance with 
public obligations more routine would be more open to altering their behavior in 
response to changes in the efficiency of the tax authority. 
Thus, the difference between white and black citizens under apartheid may have 
been not only that whites identified with the government and blacks did not. It 
may also relate to different experiences of government and its enforcement of 
rules. 
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Apartheid did not only create a racial hierarchy in access to power and privilege 
it also created a state which often behaved very differently towards white and 
black citizens. To black South Africans, the state often acted arbitrarily and 
appeared largely as an alien force. To whites, despite distortions prompted by the 
fact that intra-white tensions during the system's heyday ensured that Afrikaans-
speakers enjoyed preferences which English-speakers did not, the state was 
experienced as a set of rules which could plausibly be said to underpin mutual 
rights and obligations between the state and its citizens. Within limits, 
participation in the state could hold out a realistic expectation that obeying the 
rules, and complying with the required administrative procedures, could bring 
benefits. 
This may be more likely to inculcate a rule-bound form of behavior, which tends 
towards compliance. It must be stressed, at the risk of be laboring the point, that 
this does not mean that we can be confident of predicting the compliance 
behavior of individuals and groups from their immersion in rule-bound 
administration which they experience as relatively benign. This argument does 
not posit a direct and necessary correlation between the two. Rather, the point is 
that engagement of this sort with government may create a context in which 
enhanced technical efficiency by the tax authority can yield significant 
improvements in tax collection performance. 
Two important points must be made about these assertions. First, the argument 
made here about the legacy of the past differs significantly from the argument 
that people comply if they identify with the state. 
Rather, the point is that they are more likely to do so if they are immersed in the 
rule-bound procedures of the state in ways which make these rules seem like 
legitimate forms of regulation (even when they are resented) rather than the 
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whims of an alien power. This is important not only as a scholastic point since it 
alters fundamentally our notion of what to look for if we want to establish whether 
a particular tax culture exists. Rather than seeking taxpayers that share a sense 
of political community with the state, we look, if we want to establish a proclivity 
for meeting fiscal obligations, for those who are sufficiently immersed in the 
state's rule-bound institutions in ways, which prompt them to assume that the 
rules are indeed implemented in the manner intended. 
The question of political likes and dislikes, or even of the stated motives for 
compliance, become irrelevant. The real test is whether the people from whom 
compliance is required are used to dealing with the state in ways, which would 
make complying, to them, the most plausible response with obligations. 
The second is that a sudden rupture did not end apartheid the constitutional 
settlement of 1993 was the culmination of a lengthy period of reform apartheid, 
which began in the mid-1970s. As a result, black South Africans' experience of 
the state during this period was far more complex than the preceding analysis 
suggested because individuals and collectives experienced arbitrary and rule-
bound state behavior at the same time. 
On the collective level, the same group of people might, in the 1980s, be 
engaged in the highly rule-bound activity of registering their trade union within a 
process which ensured that compliance with legal obligations would guarantee 
bargaining rights, at the same time as they experienced arbitrary and entirely 
oppressive police behavior in response to resistance activity. And individuals 
might be participating in the rule-bound and mutually obligating process of 
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applying for a title deed for a home (after black property rights in the cities were 
conceded in the mid-1980s) while experiencing arbitrary police or official 
behavior in other contexts. 
The degree to which this has produced a culture of compliance is an important 
area for study: if the claim of one SARS official that black taxpayers behave 
much as white ones do is accurate, then there may have been sufficient 
incorporation of black people into state institutions to ensure a shared culture of 
compliance. It is possible too that current experiences of institutions, companies 
and the state, state are sufficient to compensate for history that black tax payers 
now experience a relationship with the rules of the state which tends towards 
compliance. 
This begs an obvious question how did the rule bound nature of the state arise? 
The argument advanced here, to a degree, turns on its head the assertion made 
earlier, that the tax relationship may determine the nature of the state. 
While this position does not insist that the nature of the state determines the tax 
relationship, it certainly suggests that it may have an important impact. But, if the 
tax behavior does not determine the nature of the state, then what does? The 
answer may be beyond this paper. Suffice it to say that this argument does 
support Brautigam's assertion that, where states have a colonial past, that 
experience is vital to an understanding of the nature and capacity of the state 
now. More specifically, it may be that countries who look back on a form of 
colonialism in which there was a significant settler presence in the colonized 
society may inherit forms of state more conducive to tax compliance because 
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rules and procedures designed for people who enjoyed rights in the metropolitan 
country might be expected to be more open to rule-bound administration in which 
the state met obligations to citizens rather than merely exerting arbitrary power 
over them. 
These questions deserve further inquiry. However, far more important for those 
concerned with developing better governance understandings and practices than 
the genesis of cultures of compliance is the assertion that they matter and that, 
without them, technical efficiency may have little effect in ensuring compliance. It 
is common cause that SARS's efficiencies have had far more impact among 
companies than individuals and in the formal economy than in its informal 
equivalent. While part of the explanation lies in strategic choice SARS targeted 
the formal sector as a result of a fairly obvious cost-benefit analysis and it does 
claim modest successes in the informal sector among taxi operators, it may well 
be that collecting revenues from people engaged in informal economic activity 
may prove a far greater challenge not simply because of logistical constraints but 
because the culture of compliance, which operates in the rule-bound interaction 
between the formal sector and the state, is absent among informal businesses 
and those who operate them. 
5.2.3. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 
What are the implications of this analysis for tax collection in particular, 
governance in general? 
This dissertation has argued that technical efficiency can only be effective if it is 
underpinned by a culture favorable to compliance and that this culture needs to 
be underpinned by rules, values and routines if it is to influence behavior. This 
implies an approach to tax collection different from that, which simply relies on 
more effective means of coercion. It suggests that revenue collection will be 
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enhanced if the tax collection authority is able to devise rules, which capitalize on 
that advantage. This requires 'reading the culture' which underpins tax behavior 
effectively enough to know what will influence behavior and what will not. 
SARS's success thus far clearly rests on its accurate reading of the interventions 
which would be likely to induce compliance one clear example is the use of 
public embarrassment techniques, another is the recruitment of officials with a 
history of working in private accounting firms, who share common 
understandings with the people from whom they are collecting tax: these have 
obviously enhanced effectiveness. 
Clearly, continued effectiveness will depend on the preservation of the culture 
and the routines and daily procedures, which underpin it. While these cultures 
may take years to establish themselves, and may be ingrained enough to be 
fairly robust in the face of tax collection methods of which tax payers disapprove 
and which therefore might violate the senses of fairness which makes effective 
revenue raising possible, SARS and other tax authorities may be most effective 
when they are able to see the complex system which makes relatively easy 
compliance possible as an asset and ensure, within the limits imposed by the 
need to ensure compliance, that their strategies do not threaten the 
underpinnings of compliance. 
One way of illustrating this is to examine the role of tax practitioners. As noted 
elsewhere they would seem to be obstacles to effective collection since their task 
is to advise clients on how best to avoid paying tax. Thus the Minister of Finance, 
while not necessarily referring directly to practitioners, expressed an important 
aspect of the official attitude when he complained that 'tax is avoided by 
aggressive tax planning, while purportedly adhering to the letter of the law.' 
However, it may well be that the practitioners play a crucial role in enhancing the 
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efficiency of tax collection, for it is they who communicate SARS's intentions to 
their clients. If it is accepted that effective collection depends on sending 
messages to tax payers through the set of routines which underpins the tax-
paying culture, then the practitioners are crucial conduits of the message they 
must be if they are to do their jobs. Even when they are trying to conceive ways 
of beating the system, then, they are also essential cogs in its working. 
If official intentions to regulate practitioners are implemented, regulation will need 
to be framed in ways which ensure that this function is retained if it not, a vital 
element of effectiveness may be compromised. It is also conceivable that overly 
aggressive enforcement methods could be counter-productive if they were to 
appear to violate some of the cultural underpinnings of compliance by appearing 
arbitrary and capricious. And it is important to stress the degree to which 
formality is an important ally of a tax collection agency since engagement in 
formal economic activity tends to incorporate people into the institutional 
framework which tends towards compliance. 
These points are not new to SARS senior leadership who seem very well aware 
that they are engaged in an activity in which understanding and using the 
behavior patterns of tax payers and the assumptions which underpin them are a 
crucial ingredient of success. As noted above, SARS strategies reflect this and 
their success is clearly partly attributable to it. But it is open to serious question 
whether this point is widely accepted in government. Often, compliance is 
assumed to be the natural mode of citizen behavior and policies, which rest 
crucially on it, are therefore not based on a thorough attempt to understand the 
institutions and understandings, which might tend towards or away from 
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compliance. The assumption that citizens will simply respond to a government 
decision requiring compliance is repeatedly shown to be flawed current 
examples are the switch to new forms of driver license or the registering of 
domestic workers with the Unemployment Insurance Fund. 
Ensuring compliance, will, SARS's experience shows, require a far deeper 
understanding of the behaviors, rules and norms which prompt people to tend 
towards compliance or towards ignoring particular expressions of public authority. 
SARS's performance shows too that developing this knowledge is a continuing 
process, which will be required well after a measure requiring compliance has 
been implemented. 
5.2.4. THE INFORMAL CONUNDRUM 
The second implication has been noted several times here but requires 
repetition: incorporating informal economic actors into the rule-bound relationship 
which produces the possibility of tax compliance may prove far more complex 
than some in SARS seem to believe since the issue is not simply cost, but also 
that informal activity is governed by a different set of institutions and 
understandings to its formal counterpart. This sharply limits the applicability of the 
SARS experience in countries in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the 
South where formal economic activity is limited and in those agencies and 
departments of the South African state which are required to deal with the 
millions of citizens engaged in informal activity. 
The challenge seems daunting since what is required is the creation of a culture 
of compliance, not the ability to make use of an existing culture, and cultures are 
not created quickly or easily. 
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But it is one of the key arguments of this analysis that the culture tending towards 
compliance on which SARS currently relies in its dealings with formal economic 
activity was also created it is not an innate feature of human social activity. 
Given that, there is no reason why such a culture should not be established once 
again among people who now operate outside the formal rules, even if success is 
likely to be neither easy nor rapid. And it also seems to follow from this analysis 
that a starting point will need to be a painstaking and lengthy attempt to 
understand the ideologies and institutions which underpin informal activity. While 
it seems axiomatic that the elements of a culture of compliance will be less 
evident, the strategic exercise would depend on trying to identify elements of 
informal economic and political culture which might tend towards a compliance-
oriented culture and ways in which they might be strengthened at the expense of 
the understandings and institutions which obstruct it. 
Progress may be slow and much preliminary work may be needed before greater 
understanding can produce sustained gains in much wider and more permanent 
compliance. The message for other parts of the government are much the same. 
The first step on the way to progress is an acknowledgement that many citizens 
do not work and live within the same set of rules as the people who draft policy. 
Not only do their rules need to be understood, but also as in tax collection, ways 
need to be found of capitalizing on rules and beliefs which open the way to 
compliance while seeking strategies to weaken those which do not. And the key 
to this is a much closer link between government and people engaged in informal 
activity. 
Three elements seem required to operate parallel to each other the deepening of 
representative democracy so that public representatives develop deeper links 
with citizens engaged in informal economic activity and thus a greater 
understanding of the institutions and understandings of informal economic 
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actors; a concerted attempt by government agencies to gather reliable data on 
this before framing policy and continually as they seek to implement it, and 
research studies which seek to illumine these patterns over a more protracted 
period and without being encumbered by the need to produce short-term reports 
- complex social dynamics are not quickly understood. 
None of this would make for the speedy government decisions, which some 
analysts see as the precondition of effective government. But where people 
Underpin their economic activity with a set of rules, values and behaviors which 
are obstructions to effective government, a hasty approach which does not stop 
to listen and observe carefully the beliefs and deeds which will decide whether or 
not a policy succeeds is a sure route to rapid failure. 
The history of tax collection perhaps also its present in some cases suggests 
that people outside the cultural circle, which underpins compliance, can be 
incorporated into it. But the process is likely to be difficult and lengthy, 
underpinned by a style of government more geared to trying to understand and 
learn from activity at the informal grassroots than has thus far been evident. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. TAX REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Can improved revenue collection and tax policies provide for more 
democratically accountable government? 
The theoretical literature, mainly derived from a Western political setting, has 
concluded that political considerations are important in shaping tax policies and 
their implementation. In the context of Africa, however, little is known about the 
actors involved in determining tax policies, the institutional channels applied, the 
conflicts arising, and the outcomes arrived upon (Fjeldstad et a\. 2000). 
In sub-Saharan Africa this question has gained a new urgency as many countries 
in the region are currently facing two interrelated challenges: 
Under pressure from the international finance institutions many countries are 
currently reforming their tax systems to extract more revenue from their citizens 
as aid transfers are in rapid decline. Second, a great majority of Africa's nations 
have in the early 1990s moved towards pluralist systems of rule. If Western 
experiences hold true, democratization will have profound implications for 
taxation: in democratizing environments it will be necessary to build institutional 
capacity and political legitimacy in order to generate revenues from citizens; 
confiscator or coercive forms of revenue extraction are considered incompatible 
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with the long-term process of democratic consolidation. But, does the relationship 
between taxation and accountability apply to contemporary state-society relations 
in sub-Saharan Africa? 
In order to assess whether the tax reforms have provided a 'governance bonus' 
in terms of greater responsiveness in state-society relations, we focus on three 
interrelated issues affecting the relationship between taxation and accountability. 
First, we consider the internal accountability of the tax system and ask whether 
the tax-reforms have resulted in a system of taxation with greater reach, higher 
level of efficiency and transparency. 
Second, we ask whether the tax reforms have created closer links between 
African governments and their citizens and thereby increased democratic 
accountability. 
Third, we discuss to what extent and in what ways external accountability 
relations between African governments and international donors affect domestic 
accountability relations. The empirical discussion is illustrated by the tax reforms 
currently undertaken in Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. Like many other 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in the early 1980s these three countries faced 
fiscal crises as the main revenue base export taxes declined or collapsed. 
Tax reforms were implemented as part of the economic restructuring agreements 
with the International Finance Institutions (IFIs). The creation of semi-
autonomous revenue authorities, elimination of export taxes, simplification of 
import tax brackets, and implementation of Value Added Tax (VAT) as a 
replacement of sales taxes were central components of the reform processes. In 
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all three countries, these reforms resulted at least initially in increases in the 
ratios of tax revenue to GDP, administrative improvements and a marginal 
widening of the tax-base. However, the tax reforms have only to a limited degree 
resulted in closer links between government and citizens and so far. One reason 
is that the tax reforms have not to any great extent focussed on the forms of 
taxation most profoundly affecting the relationship between governments and 
citizen's direct taxes. 
Large sectors of the economy, most notably agriculture and the informal sector, 
remain outside the tax system. As a result, a 'tax culture' seems to be lacking in 
all three countries. 
Nevertheless, with respect to formal sector business our analysis does suggest 
that, in the longer term, there may be a connection between tax-reforms and 
accountability in a sub-Saharan African setting as commercial businesses are 
beginning to use their associations to interact with. 
6.2. THE LINKS BETWEEN TAXATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Generally, accountability relations seek to assure that a person/institution 
entrusted with a particular task: 
a) carries out the given mandate, and 
b) does so in a way that is in accordance with the norms and rules 
applicable to this activity. 
It thus involves at least two parties, the one who has been entrusted with 
something that gives rise to the accountability obligation, and the principal who 
gave the mandate in the first place, or an agent delegated this authority. 
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Democratic accountability is a special case where the principal is "the people" 
and the parties owing accountability are those entrusted with political power. A 
situation characterized by democratic accountability can be defined as a situation 
where 
1. Political power-holders carry out their mandate and exercise their powers in a 
way that is transparent, in the sense that it enables other institutions and the 
public to see what is actually done, and assess whether it is in accordance with 
the mandate and the relevant norms and rules; 
2. Power-holders are answerable in the sense of being obliged to provide 
reasons for their decisions in public (which also implies an element of 
responsiveness); 
3. There are institutional checks or control mechanisms in place to prevent abuse 
of power and ensure that corrective measures are taken in cases where the 
mandate is contravened or rules are violated. 
Democratic accountability requires in addition institutional mechanisms through 
which 'the people' can punish (remove) officials who do not meet the standards, 
and influence laws and policy decisions. 
Taxation is believed to promote these qualities in public officials and institutions 
because this is necessary in order to make the population accept their tax 
obligations. 
If governments are perceived as accountable, more people will pay their taxes 
"voluntarily", which lowers the need for coercion and generally reduces the costs 
of tax-collection. 
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Conversely, if people do not see their governments as accountable, there is an 
increased likelihood that state demands for (new or higher) taxes will be met with 
protest and violence that is costly and might even jeopardize the position of those 
in power. 
The starting point for an emerging new literature on the interconnections between 
taxation and democracy in the developing world is the acknowledgement that 
bargaining over tax policies and the budget is the primary way in which different 
state and societal goals can be reconciled in a democracy (Moore 1998). 
This finding is based on European historical experiences where over the past 
two centuries taxation and disputes over the use of revenues stimulated the 
development of greater citizen rights with democratic institutions enforcing 
greater transparency in expenditures. 
History provides numerous examples of democratic concessions granted 
in order to broaden the tax-base, and of tax-payment being used as an explicit 
condition for citizens to qualify as a voter or candidate for office. This illustrates 
both a demand from taxpayers that if they are to contribute they should also have 
a say in how the money is used, and an acknowledgement from governments of 
the validity of this claim whether for pragmatic reasons or on grounds of 
reasonableness (Tilly 1992, Brautigam 1991). 
The link between taxation and accountability is typically illustrated by the battle 
cry from the American colonies' fight for independence from Britain "no taxation 
without representation". 
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Because taxpayers were consulted about the revenue raising system compliance 
in tax collection became quasi-voluntary (Levi 1988) thus, reducing collection 
costs. Furthermore, the fact that rulers and the more wealthy and influential 
sections of society bargained over the sources and uses of revenue helped 
generate a consensus over national policy issues. 
Finally taxpayer status became a valid basis for claiming political influence. Thus, 
the notion that politics determine the formulation and implementation of tax 
policies is firmly established in European and, more generally, Western 
scholarship (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Levi, 1988; Steinmo, 1993). 
6.3. TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Why should it be expected that a greater fiscal dependence of African 
governments on tax revenues could lead to greater accountability of states to 
their citizens-taxpayers? 
In most developed countries, issues of taxation rank high on the agendas of 
political parties, parliaments and governments. Taxation issues are far less 
prominent public issues in developing countries. Taxpayers in developing 
countries rarely mobilize politically. The main reason is that only a minority of 
citizens form part of the tax-net through payment of direct taxes to the state. In 
the post-colonial period, direct forms of taxation have been limited in sub-
Saharan Africa due to problems of information, taxable incomes, infrastructure 
and political sensitivity. By the time of independence, direct taxation was 
perceived as illegitimate and often the first thing a new independent government 
did was to eliminate direct taxes (hut taxes) imposed by the colonial 
governments. Constrained by political concerns, nationalist leaders relied instead 
on revenues paid by enclave mining interests or commodity exports and excise 
duties. 
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In the case of Africa, it is often noted that aid and aid dependency has 
thwarted the development of tax-accountability relations. Moore (1998) 
challenges the linkage between democracy and revenue mobilization in what he 
refers to as the 'fourth world', or developing countries, due to the strong presence 
of external forces and forms of capital. According to this perspective, the more 
states depend on unearned income the less accountable they will be towards 
their citizens. Moore argues that the more a state earns its income through the 
operation of a bureaucratic apparatus for tax collection, the more the state needs 
to enter into reciprocal arrangements with citizens about provisions of services 
and representation in exchange for tax contributions. 
Thus, when state incomes are derived from aid and economic rent, minimal 
attempts will be made to raise revenue from direct forms of taxation and, as a 
result, effective democratic governance will be undermined. The argument raised 
by Moore is important because it points to the exceedingly important role played 
by external forces in post-colonial Africa. 
Based on World Bank data, showing that in low income countries tax revenue as 
percentage of GDP has declined by almost 3 percent between the 1970s to the 
1990s, Brautigam (2002) argues that the failure of revenue-raising seems most 
acute in countries that receive large amounts of aid. With significant unearned 
incomes, arguably, African states may in the last decade have faced more 
organized and effective pressures for accountability and transparency from the 
international donor community than from their own citizens and parliaments 
(Brautigam 1999). 
In the late 1980s, after a series of external shocks, most African countries 
faced deep fiscal crises due to, among other factors, adverse terms of trade. 
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The cases of Uganda and Zambia are illustrative. In Uganda the main revenue 
source basically collapsed with the demise of the International Coffee Agreement 
in the 1980s and the subsequent fall in coffee prices. In Zambia, the dramatic 
decline in world market prices on copper reduced government revenue by half 
between 1975 and 1980. 
Since the late 1980s, a great number of sub-Saharan Africa's countries have 
received substantial amounts of aid aimed at stimulating economic policy reform. 
In most cases, the structural adjustment agreements entered into with the IFIs 
have included tax reforms. Increasingly, however, it was realized that the fiscal 
crisis was also a crisis of governance as the central state apparatuses in most 
countries of the region were plagued by political and institutional weaknesses 
that undermined their abilities to promote economic development, and collect 
revenue to sustain state activities. 
From the early 1990s onwards, both the multilateral and bilateral aid agencies 
began to emphasize 'good governance' in their aid programs. Aid has come with 
a series of 'dual conditionalities', and a relatively united body of multi- and 
bilateral donors have come to see political and economic governance as 
interconnected (World Bank 1998). From a donor perspective, where good 
(accountable) government is high on the agenda, to strengthen the domestic tax-
base has become a major issue in order to weaken the dependence on foreign 
aid and to make governments more accountable. 
In terms of tax-reforms, the emphasis on transparency and autonomy of the tax 
administration and the focus on widening of the tax, net indicate that aid policies 
in the 1990s have been founded on an implicit connection between taxation and 
accountability, based on West European history. The notion that improved 
taxation, through administrative reform and greater reach, can create 
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responsiveness and democratic accountability has guided much of the aid 
policies on tax reforms in the 1990s. The question is whether it is possible to 
establish democratic accountability mechanisms by external pressure. 
6.4. TAX AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN UGANDA, ZAMBIA AND TANZANIA 
To rephrase, our main concern in this paper is whether tax reforms have led to 
increased democratic accountability in the form of greater responsiveness of 
states to citizen, taxpayer demands. We emphasize that the expected 
relationship between taxation and accountability is mainly relevant for certain 
forms of taxation: the revenue sources that are highly 'visible' or 'felt' and thus 
directly link citizens to the state. 
These are primarily direct taxes (corporate and personal taxes). Where indirect 
taxes are relatively visible and 'felt' by large sections of the populations, such 
taxes may give rise to demands for something in return and say in how the 
money is spent. Value Added Tax (VAT) illustrates this: While referred to as an 
indirect tax, it is intended to be broad in reach and is often highly political 
because it is felt by a great number of citizens. 
In order to establish whether the implied relationship between taxation and 
accountability holds with regard to tax reforms currently carried out on the African 
continent, we need to establish whether tax reforms have lead to greater reach, 
higher levels of efficiency and transparency. In other words, we need to assess 
whether internal accountability mechanisms have been strengthened. 
Strengthening internal accountability is important in order to achieve the broader 
goal of increasing democratic accountability between the government and the 
taxpaying voters. 
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Lastly, external accountability mechanisms between governments and donors 
(multilateral and bilateral) play a crucial role in initiating and driving the reforms 
by creating incentives structures and placing conditions on the recipient 
governments. External accountability relations between the governments and 
international donors may therefore affect domestic accountability relations. 
6.4.1. THREE FORMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
There are three forms of accountability: 
1. With regard to the internal accountability of the tax system, we ask to what 
extent the reforms have succeeded in creating more efficient and trustworthy tax 
systems transparent systems capable of ensuring that tax money is not 
embezzled, and that those who should pay tax do in fact pay. 
2. We also ask whether the conditions are in place for taxation to have a positive 
effect on democratic accountability. Have reforms changed the nature of the 
tax system to the extent that taxes are being 'felt' by a majority of the population? 
And, if so, has this triggered a response in the form of demands for greater 
accountability by the citizens? Do we find evidence of governments more willing? 
to justify their decisions in public, and be constrained by institutions representing 
the public will? 
3. Has external accountability aimed at strengthening domestic accountability? 
structures through tax reforms succeeded, or has external accountability relations 
in fact hampered the development of domestic structures for democratic 
accountability? 
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6.4.2. THE INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY DIMENSION OF TAX REFORMS 
If the tax collection apparatus is inefficient, incompetent and corrupt, this is a 
strong disincentive for potential taxpayers. As part of the economic restructuring 
process, the international donor community has emphasized administrative 
reforms through the establishment of independent revenue authorities. Inspired 
by the executive agency model, currently eight countries mainly in east and 
southern Africa have established semi-autonomous revenue authorities. 
The new revenue authorities were perceived to have a positive effect on 
accountability relations: By placing the responsibility for revenue collection 
outside the civil service, the aim was to 'bypass' deficiencies in existing state 
institutions through higher salaries and more flexible procedures for hiring and 
firing employees. 
In addition, the executive agency model was regarded as an effective mechanism 
to limit direct political intervention in day to day operations. The new executive 
revenue agencies established in Uganda (1991), Zambia (1994) and Tanzania 
(1996) should be regarded as semi-autonomous, as the employees are still 
public servants. The challenge facing the revenue authorities in all three cases 
was to increase the contribution of locally raised revenue to the domestic 
budget from the very low levels prevailing in the 1980s and 1990s. It was also 
necessary to restructure taxes away from export taxes to a tax system that could 
facilitate private sector/export promoted growth. In all countries export taxes 
acted as a major disincentive for the agricultural sector and they were abolished 
in the early stages of reform. 
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6.4.3. IMPROVED REACH THROUGH A WIDENING OF THE TAX NET? 
The tax base was narrow in all three countries prior to the reforms. Success in 
widening it would be an important indicator of their success from an 
accountability perspective. The record in all three countries is strikingly similar: 
the reforms so far have focused on increasing collection through improving the 
compliance of existing and known taxpayers. 
According to a recent evaluation study by the British Department of International 
Development (DFID) of tax reforms in a number of sub-Saharan African countries 
the failure to tax the informal sector and agriculture, and the continued tendency 
of granting tax exemptions to powerful businesses individuals with close political 
connections provide the main reasons why collection appears to have stagnated 
at a relatively low level (DFID 2001). Echoing this finding, tax reforms in Uganda, 
Tanzania and Zambia appear to have worked within a largely static tax policy 
framework. In all three countries, increases in revenue are largely due to 
enhanced collection compliance. In the case of Uganda, the growth in the 
number of taxpayers does not reflect the rather broad and rapid economic growth 
recorded in recent years. 
To illustrate: Since 1998 the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) has been 
instructed to implement a Presumptive Income Tax on informal sector enterprises 
with low turnover under IMF conditionality. However, the process has been met 
with little enthusiasm in the URA, as the collection is not regarded as cost-
effective. 
In addition taxing the informal sector is regarded as politically sensitive and 
the reform has been met with little enthusiasm in political circles and the press 
(Gray, Karuga and Ssemogerere 2001 Anene and Garyio 2000, Therkildsen 
2002). Similarly, the accounts from Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) indicate 
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that more than 70 per cent of taxes collected are consumption taxes. The 
regional distribution also points to a relatively limited tax net: close to 80 per cent 
of revenues come from the region of Dar es Salaam (Temu and Due 2000, Luoga 
2001). In Zambia both the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural informal 
sector, which account for almost the entire labor force, remain outside the tax 
net. Recent tax reforms have sought to bring Zambian street vendors and Asian 
traders into the tax net. 
However, as the Minister of Finance has continued to grant significant exemption 
to corporations and individual businessmen with political connections, most 
people perceive the attempts to tax parts of the informal economy as largely 
unfair. These concerns were illustrated in the 2001 election campaign as a 
number of party programs referred to unfair tax policies as a major concern 
(Gray, Shera and Condy 2001, Aarnes and Taylor 2002, Rakner and Svasand 
2002). 
A common trend noted in all three countries is an apparent lack of ability 
and/or political willingness to apply the tax law with full force to informal operators 
perceived to be electoral important. The way VAT has been introduced helps 
explain the failure to widen the population base of the tax system. A uniform VAT 
(with major exemptions) has replaced business turnover taxes and sales tax in all 
three countries. However, as food commodities are zero-rated and most 
agricultural inputs are exempted, VAT has not included many new groups into the 
tax net. The experiences with VAT in Zambia may serve as an illustration: With 
11.000 registered VAT suppliers, of which 5.000 are active, a large part of the 
economy, and the bulk of the rural economy, largely fall outside the VAT net. 
Thus, the tax reforms have so far only to a limited extent involved the forms of 
revenue considered to affect state-citizen relations. 
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6.4.4. ASSESSING THE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY EFFECT 
In the case of democratic accountability the principal is "the people" and the 
parties owing accountability are those entrusted with political power, in the case 
of taxation primarily the executive government, the legislative and the revenue 
authorities. For taxation to have a positive effect on democratic accountability, we 
need to assess whether the reforms have changed the nature of the tax system 
to the extent that taxes are being 'felt' by a majority of the population. If so, has 
this triggered a response in the form of demands for greater accountability by the 
citizens? 
Do we find evidence of governments more willing to justify their decisions in 
public, and be constrained by institutions representing the public will? 
6.4.5. EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
With aid increasingly being conditional and with tax reform part of the 
conditionality agenda, aid and taxation may be positively related. But is this so? 
Has external accountability aimed at strengthening domestic accountability 
structures through tax reforms succeeded, or has external accountability relations 
in fact hampered the development of domestic structures for democratic 
accountability? 
There are as we have seen - indications that it may not be so easy to introduce 
democratic accountability through externally imposed tax reforms. 
The tax reforms carried out in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia have to a large 
extent been formulated and imposed by the international donor community. In all 
three countries, the IMF has maintained a lead role in advising governments on 
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major issues of design of tax policies. To meet the targets set by the IMF and 
Ministry of Finance, the revenue authorities have focussed on increasing 
collection and compliance from existing taxpayers rather than attempting the 
more complicated task of widening the tax base. The long-term process of 
building wide tax nets and cultures of voluntary compliance requires different and 
more time-consuming practices. According to the evaluation by DFID in 2001 
some countries have concentrated exclusively on increased compliance by 
known (existing) tax payers at the expense of widening the tax net in order to 
meet IMF demands (DFID 2001: 52). 
These processes are also politically more sensitive, as the resistance to taxing 
agriculture in Uganda and Zambia indicates. In the case of Uganda Therkildsen 
(2002: 28) argues that donors, and the Ugandan Ministry of Finance, by pushing 
for high revenue targets, have undermined the Uganda Revenue Authority's 
credibility in the eyes of the public, as the targets have been unrealistically high. 
6.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the above we have questioned whether recent tax reforms have contributed 
to the goal of increasing state accountability to citizens-taxpayers in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The theoretical literature, mainly derived from a Western political setting, 
concludes that domestically derived revenues will spark demands for citizens' 
participation and contribute to democratic accountability in state-society relations. 
In the context of Africa, so far little is actually known about the relationship 
between taxation and democracy. Some aspects of Africa's history and political 
institutions may indicate that the European experiences may not hold for sub-
Saharan Africa. One claim presented is that the authority and legitimacy of 
existing African governments derive principally from the fact that they are 
liberators and not from their governance practices. 
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For as long as this situation endures, the linkage between taxation, 
accountability and legitimacy will be muted (Friedman and Hlope 2002). More 
generally, it may be argued that in the context of African neo-patrimonial politics it 
is difficult to predict whether state-society representatives will really imitate the 
model of western democracies. 
There are, however, a number of reasons why we may expect the taxation-
accountability link to become more prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. As part of 
the economic restructuring processes, many African countries have embarked on 
the process of replacing the import and export taxes that used to be a major 
source of income with levies that bear more directly on individual citizens and 
enterprises. In a situation of decreasing aid transfers, many countries are 
currently reforming their tax systems in order to derive more revenue from their 
citizens as aid transfers are in rapid decline. At the same time, a great majority of 
Africa's nations have in the early 1990s moved towards pluralist systems of rule. 
However, for taxation to enhance democratic accountability to the extent that 
states become more responsive to citizens' demands, taxes must first of all be 
broad based. At a minimum, the economic and political elites must be a covered 
by the tax net. 
Taxation-accountability linkages are products of consistent, long-term political, 
institutional and cultural processes. As a result, it may not be surprising that the 
tax reforms in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia so far only to a limited degree have 
contributed to increasing state accountability to citizens/tax payers. It is however, 
worrying that donor insistence that states meet short and medium targets for 
increasing revenue collections appears to militate against accountability to 
citizens. In some instances, arbitrary, coercive treatment of taxpayers by revenue 
officials have been motivated by the need to meet donor imposed revenue 
targets. 
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Nevertheless, our analysis does find evidence that there may be a more 
positive connection, in the longer term, between this donor imposed targets and 
accountability. Commercial businesses are beginning to use their associations to 
interact with government and revenue authorities over tax collection procedures. 
While there can be no doubt that this mobilization is motivated by businesses' 
desire to reduce tax payments, the fact that these issues are being treated 
through formal, public organizations, rather than through bribery and public deals. 
This may have positive consequences for legality, legitimacy and accountability 
in environments where taxpayers currently have few or no legal rights. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. REGULATING TAX PRACTITIONER 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
South Africa comes from a past where several factors came together to create 
compliance culture that is less than it should be. 
These factors include: -
a). The economic marginalisation and consequent lack of knowledge about 
tax of a large segment of the population, 
b). The mindset and practices that took when circumventing the imposition of 
international sanctions, 
c). The historically limited capacity of the tax and customs administration to 
challenge tax evasion and highly arguable, or even fanciful, tax planning 
structures and techniques. 
SARS is engaged in a number of initiatives aimed at improving the compliance 
culture and reducing the tax gap in South Africa. As far as tax practitioners are 
concerned a significant problem for both SARS and taxpayers is that no minimum 
standard in respect of qualifications or experience is required for tax practitioners 
and that not all tax practitioners are subject to a code of professional conduct. 
In view of these issues the Budget Review 2002 stated that;" Many individual 
and business taxpayers receive advice and assistance from tax consultants and 
advisors. Although the final responsibility for the content of a tax return legally 
rests with the taxpayer, the return is completed on the advice of the tax 
consultant or advisor, who bears limited responsibility for the advice given. 
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In order to promote better compliance and ensure that taxpayers receive advice 
consistent with the tax legislation, SARS will initiate discussion on the regulation 
of tax consultants and advisors in South Africa, with appropriate sanctions in the 
event of non-compliance with tax legislation." 
A brief overview of the following issues will be discussed. 
• The Customs accredited client scheme, 
• The spectrum of possible regulation of tax practitioners, 
• The regulatory system in place in three foreign jurisdictions, and 
• A possible model for regulation in the South African context. 
7.2. CUSTOMS ACCREDITED CLIENT SCHEME 
The accredited client scheme was introduced into the Customs and Excise Act, 
91 of 1964, by way of section 65E. This scheme is open to enterprises involved 
in Customs transactions (import, export, warehouse and movement of cargo) 
which are capable of instituting and maintaining high quality internal operational 
processes and computer systems in order to comply with the Customs laws and 
procedures Clients whose internal controls meet a certain standard, whose 
records of compliance over the five years preceding accreditation is acceptable 
to SARS and whose computer systems are capable of operating within a 
paperless environment can enter into an agreement with SARS and be 
recognized as an accredited client. 
The primary benefits to the client are simplified procedures, paperless 
environment and less human intervention (border passage, removal of goods in 
bond). On the other hand, an employer or Vat vendor may choose to utilize a 
paperless means of filing a tax return (e-filing) and no sophisticated computer 
system is required by the taxpayer for this purpose. 
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The service provider rendering the e-filing service does indeed need such a 
system to enter into an agreement with SARS. In this context it is the service 
provider for tax purposes that can be equated to the accredited client for 
Customs purpose. 
7.3. SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE REGULATION 
Before considering the international example it may be appropriate to briefly 
consider the spectrum of possible regulation. 
SOME REGULATION 
NO 
REGULATION * FULLY 
REGULATED 
The two poles labeled "no regulation" and "fully regulated" are extremes and it is 
doubtful whether ant tax jurisdiction can be regarded to have no regulation, in the 
widest possible sense, or on the other hand to be fully regulated. 
Although South Africa doe not regulate tax practitioners in the sense of a code of 
conduct or a qualification requirement, certain provisions of the tax legislation 
may be applied in respect of tax practitioners acting on behalf of taxpayers. 
Section 104 (Offences and penalties) and Section105A (Reporting of 
unprofessional conduct) of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962. 
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Admittedly the second example is premised on the offender belonging to a 
professional association, body or board. 
Towards the "no regulation" end spectrum market forces are the only mechanism 
to ensure tax practitioner competence, in that taxpayers wishing to obtain sound 
tax advice will normally engage a professional person specializing in tax. This is 
the position in jurisdiction such as the UK and Ireland, where apart from 
attorneys, accountants and other professional bodies there is a specific tax 
profession. The Chartered Institute of Taxation in the UK (CIOT) and the Irish 
Institute of Taxation in Ireland. Members of these bodies are required to 
demonstrate a certain degree of competence by way of examination or 
dissertation before being allowed to utilize their professional body's designation. 
At the other end of the spectrum, no tax authority has full regulatory over tax 
practitioners. Where there is a higher degree of regulation, the regulatory body I 
often an independent government body separate from the tax practitioner and 
their qualification requirements, as in the USA. 
7.4. INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES 
7.4.1. AUSTRALIA 
• Registration of Tax Agents 
The registration of tax agents is provided for in Part VIIA of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936(ITAA36) and Part 9 of the Income Tax Regulations. A 
person must be registered as a tax agent to charge a fee for preparing or lodging 
income tax returns and objections, or for transacting business on behalf of a 
taxpayer in income tax matters. 
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If a person charges a fee for these services whilst not registered as a tax agent 
that person will be committing an offence under section 251L of the ITAA36 and 
face a fine, upon conviction, of up to 200 penalty units ($22,000). It is also an 
Offence, under section 2510 of the ITAA36, to represent oneself as a tax agent 
or to advertise that tax returns can be prepared and to attend to income tax 
matters unless registered a tax agent. The penalty for breaching section 2510 is 
a maximum fine of 10 penalty units ($1,100). 
These offences do not apply to a solicitor or counsel in certain situations where 
they are acting in the course of their profession. In order to practice as a tax 
agent a person must be registered with the Tax Agent's Board in the appropriate 
State. If a person intends to practice through a company or partnership that 
entity must be registered as the tax agent. 
7.4.2. MALAYSIA 
• Registration of Tax Agents 
Section 153 of the Malaysian Income Tax Act provides for Tax Agents. 
Subsection 1 states that" No person holding himself out as a tax agent, a tax 
consultant or a tax adviser (or under any other like description) shall be permitted 
to act in Malaysia on behalf of any person for any of the purposes of this Act 
unless he is a tax agent as defined in this section." 
A proviso to the above states, "nothing in this subsection shall be construed as 
restricting an advocate in the lawful practice of his profession." 
For the purposes of the Act, "tax agent" means: 
(a). A professional accountant authorized by or under any written law to be an 
auditor of companies; 
(b). Any other professional accountant approved by the Minister; or 
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(c). Any other person approved by the Minister on the recommendation of the 
Director General. 
In order to register as a tax agent, a fee as prescribed from time to time in the 
Gazette must be paid. Registration is valid for a period of 24 months after which 
such registration must be renewed. 
7.4.3. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
• Practice before the IRS 
Publication 947 - Practice before the IRS - discusses who can represent a 
taxpayer before the IRS. This publication seeks to address representation of a 
taxpayer after filing rather than regulating who can complete a tax return. 
Practice before the IRS can cover all matters relating to any of the following: 
• Communicating with the IRS for a taxpayer regarding the taxpayer's right, 
privileges, or liabilities under law and regulation administered by the IRS. 
• Representing a taxpayer at conferences, hearings, or meetings with the 
IRS. 
• Preparing and filing necessary documents with the IRS for a taxpayer. 
Just preparing a tax return, furnishing information at the request of the IRS, or 
appearing as a witness for the taxpayer is not practice before the IRS. These 
acts can be performed by anyone to the extent provided by the regulation 
governing practice before the IRS. 
• ENROLLED AGENTS 
The Director of Practice can grant enrolment to practice before the IRS to an 
applicant who demonstrates special competence in tax matters by passing a 
written examination administered by the IRS. Enrolment can also be granted to 
an applicant who qualifies because of the past service and technical experience 
in the IRS. Additionally, an applicant must not have engaged in any conduct that 
would justify suspension or disbarment from practice before the IRS. 
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An enrolment card will be issued to each individual whose application is 
approved. The individual is enrolled until expiration date shown in the enrolment 
card. To continue practicing beyond the expiration date, the individual must 
request renewal of the enrolment 
7.5. A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
The model conceived for discussion purposes is based on the formation of an 
Association of Tax Practitioners. This Association would have its own legal 
persona and would be run by the stakeholders themselves. 
SARS would be an important stakeholder but would not be the regulator. 
Self-regulation would enhance the credibility of the Association to all parties 
concerned, viz. the taxpayers making use of tax practitioners, SARS in working 
with tax practitioners and amongst tax practitioners themselves. 
7.5.1. LEGISLATIVE BACKING 
In order to provide the impetus for the formation of the Association of Tax 
Practitioners, a legislative provision along the following lines is proposed. 
"With effect froml January 2004 any-
(a). person rendering tax-related services for reward, other than to or on behalf 
of a single employer; or 
(b). employee of a person, who is employed solely or mainly in rendering tax-
related services to or on behalf of that person or any connected person, other 
than under the direct supervision of a member of the Association of Tax 
Practitioners entitled to full practice; who is not registered as a member in the 
appropriate membership category of the Association of Tax Practitioners shall be 
guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding two years." 
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The provision would: 
• Provide a window period for the establishment of the Association of Tax 
Practitioners and a transition period for the change to the new arrangement. 
• Identify persons rendering tax-related services to clients for reward as being 
persons that should be subject to a code of professional conduct. 
• Identify employees whose employment is solely or mainly for the purpose of 
rendering tax related services as being persons that should be subject to a 
code of professional conduct, unless they render these services under the 
direct supervision of a registered tax practitioner entitled to full practice. An 
example of an affected employee would be a tax manager for a group of 
companies. 
The provision would not: 
• Require employees working under the direct supervision of a registered tax 
practitioner entitled to full practice to register as tax practitioners. An example 
of an unaffected employee would be a tax consultant in public practice 
reporting to a registered tax practitioner entitled to full practice. 
• Require an employee responsible for the tax affairs of a company, a close 
corporation or a trust to register as a tax practitioner where this is not the sole 
or main employment of the employee. An example of an unaffected 
employee would be the financial director of a private company whose tax-
related services to the company form only a small portion of the services 
he/she provides to the company. 
An issue that has been left open for discussion is the definition of "tax-related 
services." An example of a possible exclusion from this definition would be a 
legal practitioner's representation of a taxpayer in course of litigation. In as far as 
the constitutionality of this provision is concerned it should be noted that section 
22 of the Constitution provides that, 
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"The practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law." 
Furthermore the self-regulatory environment proposed is comparable to or less 
intrusive that that of other professions in South Africa and that of the tax 
professions in other open and democratic societies. 
7.5.2. OBJECTS OF THE ASSOCIATION 
The following objects of the Association are proposed: 
(a). To promote the common interest of tax practitioners throughout the 
Republic of South Africa by means other than the carrying on by the Association 
of any trading or other profit-making activities, or the participation by the 
Association in any business, profession or occupation carried on by any of its 
members, or the provision to any of its members of financial assistance or of any 
premise or continuous services or facilities required by its members for the 
purpose of carrying on any business, profession or occupation; 
(b). To advance the theory and practice of taxation in all its aspects; 
(c). To insist upon a high standard of professional behavior on the part of 
members of the Association and to preserve and maintain the integrity and status 
of the profession, to take any steps which may be though necessary to stop or 
prevent dishonorable conduct and practices by members, for this purpose to hold 
enquiries into the conduct of members and to take disciplinary action against 
members, including the termination of their membership and their expulsion from 
the Association; 
(d). To consider and pass comment on actual or impending legislation in the 
Republic of South Africa affecting the profession or otherwise and to apply for, 
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for, or promote any Act of Parliament or other legislative enactment desirable for 
the betterment or enhancement of the profession; 
(e). To provide for research into taxation and kindred matters and to provide 
members with information on developments in professional though and methods 
both inside and outside the Republic of South Africa; 
(f). To provide opportunities for an exchange of views among members; 
(g). To implement steps to enable the profession as far as is practicable to 
speak with one voice on matters of national or international importance affecting 
the profession; 
(h). To co-operate at all times with SARS and the National Treasury; 
(i). To apply for membership of and to co-operate with national and international 
bodies representing the interest of the profession; 
(j). To provide courses, seminars or other presentation for members of the 
Association, members of other professions and interested members of the public, 
and to exchange reasonable fees to persons attending such courses; 
(k). To publish from time to time lists of members of the Association; 
(I). To provide for the amicable settlement or adjustment of professional 
disputes, including disputes between members of the public which relate directly 
or indirectly to tax practitioners; 
Page 102 
(m). To prescribe the qualification and /or experience to be obtained by any 
person wishing to become a member; 
(n). Generally to do and undertake and advise on all matters which may be 
expedient and in the interests of members of the Association and the general 
public in relation to matters of concern to the profession; 
(o). Generally to do such other things as may be incidental or conducive to the 
attaining of the above objects. 
7.5.3. COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD 
The affairs of the Association should be managed by a representation Board 
drawn from members of the Association who are resident in the Republic 
together with one representative each nominated by SARS and the National 
Treasury. 
7.5.4. MEMBERSHIP 
In addition to any absentee or honorary membership that the Association may 
wish to grant, two main categories of membership are proposed: 
1. Members entitled to limited practice. A member entitled to limited practice 
is effectively limited to returns preparation and associated functions. Such 
a member may only represent the taxpayer concerning the year or period 
covered by the return that he/she prepared. A member entitled to limited 
practice is only permitted to represent taxpayers in respect of an application 
for extension, deferred payment arrangement, query, audit or objection in 
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relation to a return he/she is preparing or prepared and is not permitted to 
represent taxpayers in respect of any other tax matter. 
2. Members entitled to full practice. A member entitled to full practice may 
provide the full spectrum of tax related services and is not limited to return 
preparation and associated functions. 
7.5.5. QUALIFICATION FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP 
Qualification for admission to the Association shall be proof to the satisfaction of 
the Board of one of the following: 
1. That the applicant has passed the examination, where applicable, and has 
the practical experience, prescribed by the board; or 
2. If the application is for admission as an associate member, that the 
applicant has passed the examination prescribed by the Board for this 
purpose, where applicable, has the practical experience prescribed by the 
Board and is a member in good standing of a body recognized by the 
Board for this purpose. Issues for discussion are the extent to which an 
associate member should be required to meet the academic and 
experience requirements set out below, as well as the bodies to be 
recognized. 
7.5.6. MEMBERS ENTITLED TO LIMITED PRACTICAL: EAXAMINATIONS 
AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE 
1. MINIMUM ACADEMIC REQUIREMENTS 
(a), where the applicant is only to prepare and file the tax returns of individuals 
who are not directors of companies and who earn a taxable income of less than 
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that at which the maximum marginal rate applies, there are no academic 
requirements. 
(b). Where the applicant is to prepare and file tax returns of any other person, 
the applicant must have passed at a South African university, technikon or 
approved equivalent: 
(i). At least one course in accounting, e.g. Accounting I; and 
(ii). At least one course in South African taxation. 
2. MINIMUM EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS 
(a). Applicants requiring no academic qualification must demonstrate that they 
have completed 2000 hours of relevant South African tax work in the preceding 
five years. 
(b). Applicants requiring at least one course in accounting and at least one 
course in South African taxation must demonstrate that they have completed 
1200 hours of relevant South African tax work in the preceding three years. 
3. RELEVANT SOUTH AFRICAN TAX WORK 
Relevant South African tax work includes: 
(a). Completing and submitting of any tax return of an individual or any other tax 
return as permitted respectively; 
(b). Responding to queries of a routine nature, e.g. a request for a schedule of 
bad debts, raised by SARS regarding any tax administered by SARS; and 
(c). Drafting objections to tax assessments of an administrative nature, e.g. 
arising out of arithmetic errors. 
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7.5.7. PUNISHABLE OFFENCES 
(a). In respect of a member entitled to limited practice, performing the following: 
• Representing a client in matters other than those pertaining to the 
preparation and submission of tax returns, applicants for extension, 
deferred payment arrangements, queries, audits, or objections; 
• Representing a client concerning a tax liability for a year or period covered 
by a return not prepared by him/her; or 
• Signing of any tax returns, any request for the extension of time in respect 
of the submission of any tax return or any deferred payment arrangement 
on behalf of a client without the express written consent of that client on 
each occasion. 
(b). Conducting himself/herself with gross negligence in connection with any 
work performed by his/her in his/her profession or employment; 
(c). Performing the following without due diligence: 
• Preparing or assisting in the preparing, approving, and submission of 
tax returns, affidavits, and other documents relating to tax matters; 
• Determining the reasonability of oral or written representation made to 
him/her by clients relating to tax matters; or 
• Determining the correctness of oral or written representation made by 
him/her to clients relating to tax matters; 
(d). Unreasonably delaying the prompt disposition of any matter before SARS; 
(e). Knowingly giving false or misleading information in connection with tax 
matters participating in such activity; 
(f). directly or indirectly attempting to influence the official action of Sars 
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employees by the use of threats, false accusations, duress, or coercion, or by 
offering gifts, favors, or ant special inducements; 
(g). Using abusive language, make false accusation and statements knowing 
the to be false, circulating or publishing malicious or libelous matter, or engaging 
in any contemptuous conduct in connection with practice before SARS; 
(h). Giving false opinion knowingly, recklessly, or through gross incompetence; 
or following a pattern of providing incompetent opinions inquisitions arising under 
the tax laws; 
(i). Directly or indirectly paying a person, other than a fellow member, a 
commission or giving such person monetary or other consideration, as 
remuneration for bringing the member work, or for inducing other persons to give 
work to the member; 
(j). Accepting directly or indirectly any commission, brokerage or other 
remuneration in respect of professional or commercial business referred to 
others as an incident to his/her service to any client, except with the knowledge 
and consent of that client; 
(k). Improperly obtaining or attempting to obtain work; 
(I). Soliciting or advertising or canvassing in the Republic (or in ant territory 
outside the Republic designated by the Board from time to time) in any manner 
not permitted by the Rules or Code of Professional Conduct prescribed by the 
Board from time to time; 
(m). Willfully refusing or failing to perform or conform with any of the provisions 
of the by-laws which it is his/her duty to do; 
(n). Committing a breach of any Rule or Code of Professional Conduct 
prescribed by the Board or, after having been previously warned by the Board or 
any committee appointed by it, continuing to commit a breach of such Rules or 
Code of Professional Conduct; 
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(o). Unlawfully failing to account for, or unreasonably delaying an accounting of 
any money or property received for or on behalf of a client or any other person 
when upon to do so; 
(p). Conducting himself/herself in a manner which, in the opinion of the 
Disciplinary Committee, is discreditable, dishonorable, dishonest, irregular or 
unworthy or which is derogatory to the Association, or tends to bring the 
profession of tax practitioners into disrepute; 
(q). Without reasonable cause fails to resign from a professional appointment 
when requested by the client to do so; 
(r). Fails to answer or deal with appropriately within a reasonable time any 
correspondence or other communication from the Association or any other 
person which requires a reply or a response; 
(s). Fails to comply within a reasonable time with an order, requirement or 
request from the Association; or 
(t). Fails after demand to pay any subscription or any fee, levy or other charge 
payable to the Association. 
7.5.8. CANCELLATION OF MEMBERSHIP 
(a). The board shall cancel the membership of any member who subsequent to 
his/her admission to membership is: 
• Removed from an office of trust on account of misconduct; or 
• Convicted of theft, fraud, forgery, or uttering a forged document or perjury 
and sentenced in respect thereof to imprisonment without the option of a 
fine or to a fine of an amount to be determined by the Board from time to 
time and published by the board for the information the members. 
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(b). The Disciplinary Committee may in its discretion order the cancellation of 
the membership of any member who id found guilty of committing a punishable 
offence. 
(c). The disciplinary Committee may in it discretion order the cancellation of the 
membership of any member whose estate is provisionally or finally sequestrated 
or who enters into an arrangement with his/her creditors subsequent to his/her 
admission to membership. 
(d). A person whose membership has been cancelled may apply for his/her re-
admission as a member after the expiry of a period of 10 years reckoned from 
the date of such cancellation, provided however that the Board may, on the 
recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee, reduce this period in any 
particular case where it considers that it would be just and equitable to do so. 
(e). The Board shall report any cancellation of membership to members and 
may report such cancellation to whomsoever else it considers appropriate, in 
whatever manner it consider appropriate. 
7.5.9. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
In addition to the Association's by-laws, it may be expected that the Association 
will also set a code of professional conduct dealing with aspect such as: 
• Objectives, integrity and objectivity 
• Conflicts of interest 
• Professional Competence 
• Confidentiality 
• Fees for Professional Services 
• Client's monies 
• Recruiting 
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7.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The proposed regulations would modify existing standards of practice. In 
particular, the proposed regulations would revise standards for opinions rendered 
by tax practitioners regarding tax shelter transactions. These opinions give 
prospective investors an assurance that the purported tax benefit of a shelter is 
likely to be sustained if challenged by SARS and may be offered in an effort to 
provide a potential investor comfort that penalties will not be imposed if the 
transaction is successfully challenged. 
The new rules would strengthen the standards regarding factual due diligence 
and legal analysis. In particular, they would help ensure that practitioners analyze 
and address carefully whether a particular transaction has a legitimate business 
reason and is not being done solely for the tax benefits, and that they consider 
and analyze all potentially relevant judicial doctrines and anti-abuse rulers. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
8.1. THE CONCEPT OF A TAX CULTURE 
Both economic scientists and politicians have disregarded the concept of a 
country-specific national tax culture for a long time. When using the expression in 
public discussion, a useful and understandable definition has not been strived for. 
For further research I propose that a national tax culture should comprehensively 
be defined as the entirety of all interacting formal and informal institutions 
connected with the national tax system and its practical execution, which are 
historically embedded within the country's culture, including the dependencies 
and ties caused by their ongoing interaction. 
From this working definition it becomes evident that to understand a specific 
county's tax 
culture requires a lot of research effort, because a lot of actors and institutions 
have to be studied as well as the procedures and processes when they interact . 
Good policy advice should not disregard the national tax-cultural constraints. 
Thus, the prevention of collective tax culture shocks should become a normative 
criterion for a "good" international and national tax policy. Furthermore, one 
should be aware that during transformation processes the appearance of tax 
culture lags is almost inevitable. 
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But still, the degree of the negative effects caused by the lag effects will vary with 
the extent of tax-cultural conformity of the new and reformed tax measures. 
Hopefully, the theory of tax culture will be able to belittle the above-mentioned 
gap between pure theoretical economic fiction and cultural reality, particularly in 
the sphere of taxation. Furthermore, tax political recommendations can be 
derived from it, especially in the context of transformation processes. 
8.2. TAX REFORMS AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INSUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
In this section we have questioned whether recent tax reforms have contributed 
to the goal of increasing state accountability to citizens-taxpayers in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The theoretical literature, mainly derived from a Western political setting, 
concludes that domestically derived revenues will spark demands for citizens' 
participation and contribute to democratic accountability in state-society relations. 
In the context of Africa, so far little is actually known about the relationship 
between taxation and democracy. Some aspects of Africa's history and political 
institutions may indicate that the European experiences may not hold for sub-
Saharan Africa. 
One claim presented is that the authority and legitimacy of existing African 
governments derive principally from the fact that they are liberators and not from 
their governance practices. For as long as this situation endures, the linkage 
between taxation, accountability and legitimacy will be muted (Friedman and 
Hlope 2002). 
More generally, it may be argued that in the context of African neo-patrimonial 
politics it is difficult to predict whether state-society representatives will really 
imitate the model of western democracies. 
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There are, however, a number of reasons why we may expect the taxation-
accountability link to become more prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. As part of 
the economic restructuring processes, many African countries have embarked on 
the process of replacing the import and export taxes that used to be a major 
source of income with levies that bear more directly on individual citizens and 
enterprises. 
In a situation of decreasing aid transfers, many countries are currently reforming 
their tax systems in order to derive more revenue from their citizens as aid 
transfers are in rapid decline. At the same time, a great majority of Africa's 
nations have in the early 1990s moved towards pluralist systems of rule. 
However, for taxation to enhance democratic accountability to the extent that 
states become more responsive to citizens' demands, taxes must first of all be 
broad based. At a minimum, the economic and political elites must be a covered 
by the tax net. 
Taxation accountability linkages are products of consistent, long-term political, 
institutional and cultural processes. As a result, it may not be surprising that the 
tax reforms in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia so far only to a limited degree have 
contributed to increasing state accountability to citizens/tax payers. 
It is however, worrying that donor insistence that states meet short and medium 
targets for increasing revenue collections appears to militate against 
accountability to citizens. In some instances, arbitrary, coercive treatment of 
taxpayers by revenue officials have been motivated by the need to meet donor 
imposed revenue targets. 
Nevertheless, our analysis does find evidence that there may be a more 
positive connection, in the longer term, between this donor imposed targets 
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and accountability. Commercial businesses are beginning to use their 
associations to interact with government and revenue authorities over tax 
collection procedures. 
While there can be no doubt that this mobilization is motivated by businesses' 
desire to reduce tax payments, the fact that these issues are being treated 
through formal, public organizations, rather than through bribery and public deals. 
This may have positive consequences for legality, legitimacy and accountability 
in environments where taxpayers currently have few or no legal rights. 
8.3. CULTURE, TAX COLLECTION AND GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Incorporating informal economic actors into the rule-bound relationship which 
produces the possibility of tax compliance may prove far more complex than 
some in SARS seem to believe since the issue is not simply cost, but also that 
informal activity is governed by a different set of institutions and understandings 
to its formal counterpart. 
This sharply limits the applicability of the SARS experience in countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the South where formal economic activity 
Is limited and in those agencies and departments of the South African state 
which are required to deal with the millions of citizens engaged in informal 
activity. 
The challenge seems daunting since what is required is the creation of a culture 
of compliance, not the ability to make use of an existing culture, and cultures are 
not created quickly or easily. But it is one of the key arguments of this analysis 
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that the culture tending towards compliance on which SARS currently relies in its 
dealings with formal economic activity was also created it is not an innate feature 
of human social activity. 
Given that, there is no reason why such a culture should not be established once 
again among people who now operate outside the formal rules, even if success is 
likely to be neither easy nor rapid. 
And it also seems to follow from this analysis that a starting point will need to be 
a painstaking and lengthy attempt to understand the ideologies and institutions 
which underpin informal activity. While it seems axiomatic that the elements of a 
culture of compliance will be less evident, the strategic exercise would depend on 
trying to identify elements of informal economic and political culture which might 
tend towards a compliance oriented culture and ways in which they might be 
strengthened at the expense of the understandings and institutions which 
obstruct it. 
Progress may be slow and much preliminary work may be needed before greater 
understanding can produce sustained gains in much wider and more permanent 
compliance. 
The message for other parts of the government are much the same. The first 
step on the way to progress is an acknowledgement that many citizens do not 
work and live within the same set of rules as the people who draft policy. Not only 
do their rules need to be understood, but also as in tax collection, ways need to 
be found of capitalizing on rules and beliefs which open the way to compliance 
while seeking strategies to weaken those which do not. And the key to this is a 
much closer link between government and people engaged in informal activity. 
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Three elements seem required to operate parallel to each other the deepening of 
representative democracy so those public representatives develop deeper 
links with citizen engaged in informal economic activity and thus a greater 
understanding of the institutions and understandings of informal economic actors; 
a concerted attempt by government agencies to gather reliable data on this 
before framing policy and continually as they seek to implement it, and research 
studies which seek to illumine these patterns over a more protracted period and 
without being encumbered by the need to produce short-term reports complex 
social dynamics are not quickly understood. 
None of this would make for the speedy government decisions, which some 
analysts see as the precondition of effective government. But where people 
underpin their economic activity with a set of rules, values and behaviors which 
are obstructions to effective government, a hasty approach which does not stop 
to listen and observe carefully the beliefs and deeds which will decide whether or 
not a policy succeeds is a sure route to rapid failure. 
The history of tax collection perhaps also its present in some cases suggests that 
people outside the cultural circle, which underpins compliance, can be 
incorporated into it. But the process is likely to be difficult and lengthy, 
underpinned by a style of government more geared to trying to understand and 
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